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I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental mission of the United States Army is to
deter war. Deterrence is best served by the maintenance of
credible forces guided by sound doctrine. The United States
Army has established AirLand Battle doctrine as the body of
principles which will guide the operational and tactical
employment of its forces should conflict become necessary.
The doctrine is predicated upon a nonlinear battlefield
where maneuver is as important as firepower, and where
unified air and ground operations are conducted deep into
enemy rear areas. The focus of AirLand Battle doctrine is
warfare within the corps and division, where the operational
and tactical levels of war are not clearly separable.
[Ref. 1]
The Airland Research Model is a corps level force-on-
force combat simulation currently under development at the
Naval Postgraduate School [Ref. 2]. The goal of the
research is to develop modelling methodologies which are
appropriate for the construction of a representation of the
AirLand Battle, and in particular the rear area interdiction
battle.
The simulation is to be systemic and capable of
producing detailed audit trails tracing cause and effect
relationships. Rule based "expert systems" are proposed to
model command and control decisions. It is envisioned that
human players will be used at major decision points to gain
further modelling insight. Generalized network methodolo-
gies are being developed to represent terrain, transporta-
tion systems, communications links, and organizational
structures. A generalized value system is being constructed
which will permit interdictions to be based on value
comparisons among heterogeneous targets. The concept of time
discounting is being considered to impute values to comba-
tants and the units which support them. A variable resolu-
tion architecture is proposed which is based on function,
situation, and mission. The resolution requirements are
being determined by research into the development of plan-
ning submodules for each hierarchical level and supporting
functional area.
A primary design objective for the Model is the incorpo-
ration of prescriptive methodologies where appropriate. The
purpose is to provide an analysis tool for investigating
"more optimal" methods of planning for and executing the
AirLand Battle. Up to the present time, most combat simula-
tions have attempted to describe combat processes, focusing
primarily on modelling execution.
The purpose of this thesis is to present prescriptive
algorithms which allocate engineer resources to interdict
transportation networks in a simulation of the AirLand
Battle. A game theoretic structure is proposed in which to
evaluate relevant opposing strategies and decide upon
courses of action. The structure is applicable to planning
at the maneuver brigade level in the Model and constitutes a
desirable method for decision making against an active
opponent
.
Chapter II provides an overview of the combat engineer
system as it exists within a U. S. Army corps. The units and
missions are outlined to provide a basis for the subsequent
discussion of modelling issues. Chapter III discusses
modelling resolution issues pertinent to the development of
an engineer planning model. It presents a format for a rule
based data structure which specifies relationships between
resources and their potential effects. Chapter IV discusses
the modelling of decisions within the Research Model and
establishes the desirability of the game theoretic
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construct. Chapter V presents a brigade engineer planning
model which employs a two person zero sum game to select
both engineer and enemy options for execution. Chapter VI
abstracts the resource allocation problem and formulates a
mathematical model for the countermobility mission. The
focus of the chapter is a heuristic algorithm which speci-
fies resource allocations to establish an expected lower
bound on opponent transit times through a transportation
network. Chapter VII summarizes the research and provides




II. U.S. COMBAT ENGINEERS
GENERAL
Today more than ever before, the engineer plays a crit-
ical role as a member of the combined arms team. As
movement and lethality on the battlefield increase, the
requirement to reinforce the terrain increases. The
engineer brings to the combined arms team a terrain
oriented system that enhances the capability of our
weapons systems while decreasing the effectiveness of
the enemy weapons. [Ref. 3: p. lii]
The purpose of this chapter is provide an overview of
the combat engineer system as it exists within a U.S. Army
corps. This system is comprised of a variety of units, from
organic divisional engineer battalions to special purpose
organizations responsible for atomic demolitions. Since the
focus of study in the Airland Research Model effort is
armored and mechanized combat, the discussion in this
chapter will be confined to those engineer units which
support such forces. First, the general mission areas for
which engineers have responsibility will be presented. The
structure of divisional and corps engineer units will then
be outlined. Finally, principles for engineer employment
within the corps will be discussed.
B. MISSION AREAS
The Army AirLand Battle doctrine specifies that engi-








In addition, engineers have a topographic mission to provide
detailed terrain studies and produce maps for the corps.
Finally, engineers may be tasked to reorganize and fight as
infantry. The nature of requirements in the four main
mission mission areas will be considered further.
1. Mobility
An important aspect of the AirLand Battle doctrine
is the ability of forces to maneuver effectively across the
breadth and depth of an extended battlefield. Mobility
relates to those engineer tasks which enable a force to move
without restrictive delays due to terrain or obstacles.
Mobility tasks may be categorized into five areas:
1. Detection, bypass, marking, and breaching of
minefields
.




4. Construction and maintenance of combat roads and
trails
.
5. Expedient construction necessary to support army and
air force aviation.
While all army units have an inherent ability to overcome
many terrain impediments, engineer units are designed to
perform those tasks exceeding supported unit capabilities.




The ability to concentrate forces at the decisive
time and place is the key to success on the modern battle-
field. Thus, the ability to inhibit the maneuver of threat
forces is an essential element of AirLand Battle doctrine.
Countermobility tasks are those activities which reinforce
terrain to delay, disrupt, and attrite the enemy. The
construction of obstacles occurs both in offensive and
defensive operations and is the primary means by which
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engineer forces counter threat mobility. The use of obsta-
cles not only causes delays, but also improves the acquisi-
tion and hit probabilities of defending weapon systems.
Obstacles are sited to enhance the effectiveness of direct
fire weapons and are thus viewed as "combat multipliers".
In the formulation of a countermobility plan, care is taken
to ensure that obstacle placement does not impede the
subsequent maneuver of friendly forces. Conventional obsta-







Conventional obstacles are often labor and resource inten-
sive and thus must be prepared prior to a battle. To reduce
their impact on friendly mobility, obstacles may be prepared
but not executed until contact with the threat is imminent.
The advent of artillery and aircraft delivered minefields
has introduced a dynamic element into countermobility plan-
ning. The employment of scatterable mines permits a maneuver
commander to create an obstacle nearly anywhere on the
battlefield. [Ref. 3: p. 2-3, 17: p. 1-33]
3 . Survivability
The increased lethality and range of weapons on the
AirLand battlefield requires that significant consideration
be given to those tasks which enhance system survivability.
The threat has the ability to employ conventional, chemical,
and nuclear weapons and to use sophisticated surveillance
and target acquition systems. Survivability tasks involve
the construction of protective structures, the use of camou-
flage to conceal locations and the fabrication of false
14
positions to deceive the enemy. Forward engineer elements
will construct hasty hull defilade positions for direct fire
systems while corps engineers will construct artillery and
air defense positions in rear areas. The protection of
command and control centers and key logistical facilities
will also be a priority for nondivisional engineer units.
[Ref. 5: p. 1-5]
4 . General Engineering
General engineering refers to tasks performed in
rear areas throughout the corps which do not directly
contribute to the committed maneuver units. Corps engineer
assets are the principal means by which such missions are
accomplished. Typical tasks include:
1. Improvement and maintenance of main supply routes.
2. Rear area survivability construction for indirect
fire and logistics units.
3. Repair and construction of airfields.
4. Replacement of assault bridging with tactical
bridging
.
5. Purification of water.
The emphasis on rapid support of forward divisional elements
by combat service support units requires the continued
development of the corps infrastucture during a campaign.
General engineering work contributes toward this purpose.
[Ref. 3: p. 2-7]
C. DIVISIONAL ENGINEER BATTALION
1 . Mission
Each armored and mechanized division has an organic
combat engineer battalion. The mission of this battalion is
to increase the combat effectiveness of the supported divi-
sion by performing tasks in the general engineer mission
areas. The battalion has the following capabilities:
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1. Emplace and remove obstacles.
2. Conduct hasty stream crossings.
3. Construct, repair and maintain roads, bridges, and
aviation facilities.
4. Support the assault of fortified positions.
5. Provide water supply facilities.
6. Conduct engineer reconnaissance.
7. Provide technical assistance in the use of camouflage
and the fortification of positions. [Ref. 3 p. B-6J
2 . Organization
The divisional engineer battalion is composed of a
headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), four line
companies, and a bridge company.
a. HHC
The HHC is organized into supporting staff
sections and a heavy equipment platoon. The HHC is respon-
sible for routine administration among companies and has a
limited medical and equipment maintenance capability.
Logistics are provided to the companies through the HHC. The
equipment platoon has four road graders, three bulldozers
and two 20-ton cranes which may be formed into teams to




The line companies each consist of a headquar-
ters platoon and three line platoons. The headquarters
platoon is responsible for administration within the
company. It also contains two combat engineer vehicles
(CEV) a backhoe, a bulldozer, and two scooploaders , which
support platoons at the commander's discretion.
The three line platoons consist of a headquar-
ters section and three line squads. The squad vehicle is the
M113 armored personnel carrier which transports the squad,
16
tools, and obstacle materials to construction sites. The
squads are equipped to accomplish demolition, carpentry, and
pioneer construction tasks. [Ref. 3: p. B-7]
c . Bridge Company
The type of bridge company found within the
battalion will vary with the needs of the division and its
geographical location. The company is' organized into two
heavy raft sections, an armored vehicle launched bridge
(AVLB) section, and a company headquarters. The heavy raft
sections may have either the mobile assault bridge (MAB) or
the M4T6 float bridge. The unit is designed to support
brigade sized stream crossings and needs the support of
corps bridging assets to conduct divisional crossings.
[Ref. &5100. : p. B-7]
The MAB is a self-propelled, amphibious unit
which can be driven into the water and linked to form rafts
or bridges. When outfited with MAB assets, each section is
capable of constructing two 40 meter rafts or one 85 meter
bridge. The M4T6 is a hand erectable, air transportable
bridge system consisting of pneumatic floats and an aluminum
deck of interlocking pieces. With M4T6 , each section can
construct two 16 meter rafts or two 43 meter bridges.
[Ref. 4: p. C-23]
The AVLB section has four launchers and six
bridges. The AVLB is mounted on a tank chassis and is
employed in the hasty crossing of gaps less than 57 feet
wide. The bridge can be launched without exposing the crew
to small arms fire, and can be retrieved from either end.
[Ref. 4: p. C-20]
In addition to the above bridging assets, the
company has a bulldozer for the preparation of crossing site
approaches, a crane for material handling, and 15-man pneu-
matic assault boats. When the unit is equipped with M4T6 , it
also has two light tactical raft sets. [Ref. 3: p. B-7]
17
D. CORPS ENGINEER BRIGADE
Above division level, engineer forces are tailored to
meet the specific requirements of the supported corps or
theater. This flexible structure aggregates all attached
engineer battalions and companies supporting a corps into an
engineer brigade. The brigade is capable of controlling
five to seven battalion equivalents through a brigade head-
quarters and headquarters company. As additional engineer
units are assigned to the corps, engineer groups are formed
within the brigade. A group has an organic HHC , and may
control from two to five battalion equivalents. The brigade
may expand to contain from two to four engineer groups . The
formation of brigades and groups are based on long term
operations. Short term requirements are met by placing the
necessary engineer unit in an attached or operational
control status. [Ref. 3: p. N-2]
The following sections outline the engineer units which
would typically be found within an engineer brigade or
group
.
1. Engineer Combat Battalion Corps
a. Mission
The engineer combat battalion is normally allo-
cated to the corps on the basis of three per division. Its
mission is to increase the combat effectiveness of the corps
by means of combat engineer support and general engineer
work. It may be tasked to reinforce divisional engineer
units and to perform infantry combat missions. The
battalion has the following capabilities:
1. Construct, repair, and maintain roads, fords, landing
strips, command posts, logistics facilities, and
related structures.
2. Prepare and remove obstacles and minefields.
3. Provide water purification.
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4. Construct defensive installations.
5. Engage in river crossings.
6. Support the assault of fortified positions.
7. Plan and prepare sites for atomic demolition munition
(ADM) teams. [Ref. 3: p. B-15]
b. Organization
The battalion consists of an HHC and four line
companies. The composition of the battalion is very similar
to the divisional engineer battalion. The major exception is
the absence of a bridge company. Other differences include
the presence of a construction section of carpenters and
plumbers in the HHC, and the use of 5 -ton dump trucks for
squad vehicles in the line companies. [Ref. 3: p. B-16]




This battalion is normally allocated to the
engineer brigade on the basis of one to four per engineer
group. The mission of the battalion is to construct and
rehabilitate roads, airfields, pipeline systems, and facili-
ties. Additionally, it increases the effectiveness of divi-
sions, corps, and army groups by providing combat engineer
support and general engineer work. It may perform combat
infantry missions as required. The battalion is designed to
have the following capabilities: [Ref. 3: p. B-16]
1. Provide construction and rehabilitation of routes of
communication, bridges, forward airfields, and
heliports
.
2. Provide general construction of buildings, struc-
tures, and facilities.
3. Provide limited reconstruction of railroads and
ports
.
4. Assist in the emplacement and removal of obstacles.
5. Provide technical assistance in the fortification of
positions
6. Assist in the assault of fortified positions.
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b. Organization
The battalion is organized into an HHC , an engi-
neer equipment and maintenance company, and three engineer
companies. The HHC is responsible for the normal adminis-
trative functions within the battalion. The major assets of
the equipment and maintenance company include four cranes
,
three scooploaders , two bulldozers, three ditching machines
a 75- ton-per-hour rock crushing plant, and two bituminous
distributors. [Ref. 3: p. B-17]
The engineer companies are organized into a
headquarters, a maintenance section, a support section, a
horizontal construction platoon and two general construction
platoons. The major items of equipment in this company
include a 25-ton crane, three road graders, three bull-
dozers, a scooploader, four 18-cubic yard earth scrapers and
six 20-ton dump trucks. [Ref. 3: p. B-16]
3 . Corps Bridge Companies
Corps bridge company allocation is dependent upon
the number and type of divisions in the corps and the nature
of the terrain in the area of operations. The normal alloca-
tion objective is to support the corps with six float bridge
companies and four fixed bridge companies. All bridging
would be assigned to the engineer brigade and generally
would be attached to an engineer group. Five types of
bridging company will be considered here. [Ref. 3: p. B-29]
a. Mobile Assault Bridge Company
This company is equipped with the mobile assault
bridge, MAB , and has the mission of supporting assault river
crossing operations. The company can erect bridges and




1. One 212 meter bridge.
2. Two 117 meter bridges.
3. Three 85 meter bridges.
4. Six 40 meter rafts.
The company is organized into a headquarters, an equipment
and maintenance platoon, and three bridge platoons. Major
items of equipment include 24 MAB interior bays, 12 MAB end
bays, a 20-ton crane, a scooploader, and a bulldozer.
[Ref. 3: p. B-20]
b. Engineer Float Bridge Company
The float bridge company is outfited with the
M4T6 bridge and has the mission of transporting and super-
vising the erection of tactical stream crossing equipment.
It can also provide substantial logistics hauling capability
when bridging assets are downloaded. The company can
provide
:
1. 212 meter of floating bridge or nine M4T6 rafts.
2. 80 meters of light floating bridge or six light
rafts
.
3. Seventy 15-man pneumatic assault boats.
The company is organized into a headquarters, and equipment
and maintenance platoon, five float bridge platoons, and a
support platoon. The company contains 39 cargo trucks, 60
5-ton stake trucks, five M4T6 bridge sets, six light
tactical raft sets, a bulldozer, and a 20-ton crane.
Generally, the manpower to erect the bridging in this
company must be provided by other units. [Ref. 3: p. B-22]
c. Engineer Assault Float Bridge Company
This company is equipped with ribbon bridge,
which is a modular, floating bridge/raft system made of an
aluminum alloy. The company has the mission to transport and
assemble the bridging and to provide cargo hauling in emer-
gencies. Capabilities include:
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1. 215 meters of bridge or six rafts.
2. Underwater demolitions.
3. Crossing site selection and preparation.
The company contains a headquarters, an equipment and main-
tenance platoon, and two float bridge platoons. Major
equipment includes 30 ribbon interior bays, 12 ribbon ramp
bays, 14 bridge erection boats, 56 5-ton bridge transporter
trucks, a 20-ton crane, and two bulldozers. [Ref. 3: p.
B-22]
d. Engineer Medium Girder Bridge Company
The medium girder bridge (MGB) company is
equipped with a hand erectable, heavy duty alloy bridge and
has the mission of providing fixed bridge support to the
corps. The MGB is used primarily for rapid tactical bridging
in the forward main battle area. The company is responsible
for the transportation and assembly of the MGB and has the
following capabilities:
1. Four 30.5 meter bridges or two 49.7 meter bridges.
2. Simultaneous erection of two bridges.
3. 150-ton capacity per haul on 5-ton dump trucks when
bridging is immobilized.
The company is composed of a company headquarters , an equip-
ment and maintenance platoon, and two bridge platoons. The
bridge platoons each have two MGB sets. [Ref. 3:. p. B-23]
e. Engineer Panel Bridge Company
The panel bridge company is equipped with the
Bailey panel bridge set and has the mission to transport and
advise on its erection. The Bailey bridge is a hand erec-
table, steel component set which is both time and labor
intensive. It is generally used to replace tactical
bridging, such as MGB, freeing the latter for use in forward
battle areas. The company has the following capabilities:
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1. Erect bridges of various lengths and load classes, up
to one 58.5 meter tracked class 60 bridge.
2. 145- ton capacity per haul on 5- ton dump trucks when
bridging is immobilized.
The company organization consists of a headquarters, an
equipment and maintenance platoon, and two bridge platoons.
Major equipment includes 29 5-ton dump trucks, one Bailey
bridge set, two 20-ton cranes, one scooploader, one cable
reinforcement set, one bulldozer, and a welding shop.
[Ref. 3: p. B-20]
4. Corps Special Support Companies
To support corps requirements beyond the capabili-
ties of the organizations reviewed thus far, three addi-
tional units would normally be assigned to the engineer
brigade. These are an atomic demolition munitions company,
a combat support equipment company, and a cartographic
company and terrain team.
a. Atomic Demolition Munitions Company
The ADM company supports denial operations in
the corps by using atomic demolitions to destroy major
bridges, dams, transshipment facilities, and installations.
The unit has the following capabilities:
1. Provide liaison and planning assistance for ADM
employment
.
2. Provide reconnaissance of ADM targets.
3. Prepare and detonate 24 ADM devices.
The company organization consists of a headquarters, an
operation section, and six ADM platoons. Each platoon
consists of four firing squads of five men and a platoon
headquarters. [Ref. 3: p. B-23]
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b. Combat Support Equipment Company
The mission of this unit is to augment engineer
combat operations with manned construction equipment. The
company functions as an asset pool from which corps and
divisional units may be supported. The company can support
from one to three engineer combat battalions engaged in
general engineering. The company is organized into a head-
quarters, a dump truck platoon, three equipment platoons,
and equipment support platoon, and a maintenance platoon.
The company possesses numerous items of equipment including
26 20-ton dump trucks, four 20-ton cranes, nine road
graders, nine 18-cubic yard earth scrapers, four
scooploaders , and four dozers. [Ref. 3: p. B-19]
c. Engineer Cartographic Company
The corps is supported by one cartographic
company which compiles, revises, reproduces, and distributes
maps . The corps terrain team is placed in direct support of
numbered corps. The team consists of a headquarters, a
collection section, an interpretation and analysis section,
and an information section. The collection section verifies
reports and compiles data needed by the command. The- inter-
pretation and analysis section makes studies and predictions
based on photo interpretation. The information section
stores data and disseminates overlays or reports as needed.
[Ref. 3: p. B-18]
E. ENGINEER EMPLOYMENT
The focus of engineer employment in the corps is the
support of committed divisions. Corps engineers will often
work as far forward as maneuver brigade rear areas
.
Normally, two corps combat engineer battalions will be
located in a division area to meet requirements beyond
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organic engineer capabilities. These battalions will be
placed in a direct support (DS) or general support (GS)
command relationship. [Ref. 3: p. 2-8]
The division engineer is the commander of the divisional
engineer battalion and is the single engineer point of
contact for the division commander. All supporting engineer
activity in the division area is coordinated through the
organic engineer battalion. Maneuver brigades normally have
an engineer company in direct support which performs this
coordination function. When engineer assets supporting a
brigade exceed the span of control of the company, an engi-
neer task force may be formed. [Ref. 3: p. 2-9]
The brigade engineer is the commander of the company in
direct support of a brigade. He allocates engineer platoons
and resources to maneuver task forces as the tactical situ-
ation demands. Engineers are attached to maneuver units
only when time and distance factors prohibit control by the
parent organization.
Engineer units not in direct support of brigades are
assigned general engineering missions. These missions may be
controlled by specific task assignment, or by work coordina-
tion lines or areas. Corps units commonly involved in such
missions include the engineer combat battalion, the engineer
combat battalion, heavy, and the combat equipment support
company. [Ref. 3: p. 2-9]
It is evident that resource allocation decisions and
planning coordination are the responsibility of the senior
engineer at each hierarchical level. While the pool of
assets available to support operational missions may vary,
this principle governing utilization is well established.
Much of the detailed planning which accompanies engineer
support operations is decentralized, but subject to review
and revision by higher authority. Thus, combat engineers are
structured to support the local goals of supported units,
subject to constraints imposed by parent organizations.
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The presentation of a framework for representing the
planning of combat engineer resource allocations is the
subject of the present study. This chapter briefly outlined
the missions, capabilities, and structure of engineer units
within a corps. It provides a foundation for the following
chapters which discuss issues relevant to modelling the
engineer system.
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III. MODELLING THE ENGINEER SYSTEM
A. GENERAL
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a framework
for representing planning in the combat engineer system.
The issues of modelling resolution and mission representa-
tion are discussed in sufficient detail to permit the later
development of prescriptive planning methodologies which
specify the allocation of engineer systems and resources.
Emphasis is on the resolution necessary for planning
purposes alone and should be clearly differentiated from the
details of execution modelling which are to be addressed in
future research.
The first sections of this chapter focus on the resolu-
tion issues necessary to develop decision criteria for engi-
neer planning. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the rule based decision table which will guide resource
allocation.
B. ENTITY REPRESENTATION
This section presents a general discussion of the issue
of modelling resolution. Modelling implies abstraction and
in most instances requires the selection of a small number
of variables thought to be most significant in the system
under study. It is necessary for the modeller to identify
and categorize the relevant variables before a final selec-
tion is made. This permits an appreciation for the limita-
tions of the simulation and provides an agenda for future
enhancements to the model.
27
1 . Definitions
Entities are objects which will be explicitly repre-
sented in the model and include both engineer systems such
as units and equipment, and engineer material such as demo-
litions. Attributes are characteristics which describe the
entities and may be divided into two categories: inherent
and system state attributes. Inherent attributes will remain
constant for an entity under a given set of conditions.









System state attributes will be variable and
include
1. Location in the x-y plane
2. Operational status
Operational status may be categorized into two classes,
operative and inoperative. Operative systems are further
identified as either currently idle and awaiting assignment
to a task or committed to a task at a designated location.
Inoperative systems are classified in a manner to be
prescribed by research into the modelling of logistics and
maintenance [Ref. 11]. The identifiers will discriminate
battle damage from routine mechanical failure and will
facilitate the maintenance recovery decision logic.
Analogous classifications will exist for human systems such
as squads and platoons where the decision process relates to
medical evacuation and personnel replacement.
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Engineer material entities are identified by the
following inherent attributes:
1. Standard package name
2. Weight and volume
3. Logistical class
The state attributes include:
1. Location in the x-y plane
2. Quantity in standard packages
The concept of a standard package of obstacle
material was developed in previous research and is a
modelling convention in which the materials necessary to
create one obstacle of a given type are treated as a single
entity within the model [Ref. 12: p. 26]. The concept
reduces the computational requirements for the transporta-
tion and logistics functional areas as well as for the engi-
neer planning model.
2. Effects Modelling
In a general sense there are two methods of repre-
senting the contribution of the combat engineer system
within the Research Model. The first approach involves
explicitly modelling only the effects of the engineer system
on the environment. This would involve the modification of
terrain attributes to reflect the presence of obstacles,
combat trails, fortifications and other combat engineer
products without representing the engineer system entities
responsible for their creation. Maneuver entities would be
confronted with tactical situations requiring supporting
decision logic capable of directing actions at obstacles and
adjusting for the resulting differences in weapons exchange
ratios. The scope of terrain modification could be kept
within realistic bounds by applying time and resource
constraints to the construction effort.
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3 . Explicit Modelling
The first approach is a useful abstraction in combat
models which focus primarily on direct fire engagements.
However, a simulation representing a highly integrated
battlefield has different requirements. The explicit repre-
sentation of selected engineer system entities is necessary
to perform sensitivity analyses on the value of various
support combinations. For example, the decision to employ an
engineer system such as a bridging unit should not only be
driven by the need of a maneuver unit to conduct a river
crossing, but also by the probability that the bridging will
be acquired by enemy reconnaissance and targeted.
Additionally, the presence of a bridging entity in the
vicinity of a maneuver unit would be a key input for an
enemy intelligence module to compute intention.
Engineer equipment is often considered a low density
item by logistical support units since it appears in much
smaller quantities than combatants such as tanks or armored
personnel carriers. This uniqueness poses special difficul-
ties for maintenance units responsible for the repair of
engineer systems. The explicit representation of such
systems would enable an analysis of the impact of doctrinal
employment decisions upon both supported maneuver units and
supporting maintenance facilities. In choosing which
systems to represent, the modeller must hypothesize the
nature and extent of the interconnectivities likely to have
the greatest effect upon the variables of concern.
C. ENGINEER MISSION AREA REPRESENTATION
This section relates the traditional engineer mission
areas to their implications in the Airland Research Model.
Following a review of these mission areas, the focus of
effort in the present iteration of model development is
identified, and mission tasks are proposed.
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1 . Mission Areas
As described in Chapter II, the corps and divisional
engineer units in the division area of operations are
oriented toward accomplishing tasks in four mission areas.
Mobility tasks are oriented "on reducing or negating the
effects of obstacles to improve movement of maneuver/weapon
systems and critical supplies" [Ref. 3: p. iii]
.
Count ermobility tasks involve the reinforcement of existing
terrain by the construction of obstacles to delay, disrupt,
and attrite the enemy. Survivability tasks involve the
development of protective positions and countersurveillance
measures which reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapon
systems. General engineering relates to actions which main-
tain, repair, and develop the infrastructure of the corps
area. In addition to these four principal mission areas,
engineers have a topographic mission to provide terrain
studies and map production facilities within the corps.
Finally, engineers may be called upon to reorganize and
fight as infantry.
The focus of research in the present modelling
effort is to identify the structure of a planning method-
ology which prescribes the assignment of engineer resources
to mission area tasks in an efficient manner for a fixed
time horizon. Issues to be addressed include the concepts of
feasibility and optimality. Defining the set of feasible
alternatives, while not a trivial task, can be significantly
simpler than demonstrating optimality. Key to the discussion
of either issue is the selection of criteria by which each
may be evaluated.
It is hypothesized that relevant measures of effec-
tiveness by which combat actions may be judged are functions
of time and attrition. The activities of combat engineers
have measureable effects upon both the duration and
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lethality of engagements. The construction of major impedi-
ments to movement may significantly delay the arrival of an
attacking force, affording the defender time to reinforce
battle positions. Lesser obstacles cause temporary delays
which can improve the firing effectiveness of defending
weapons systems . Mobility efforts are aimed at overcoming
these delays. Survivability tasks, such as the construction
of defilade fighting positions, reduce the expected attri-
tion to protected systems. Finally, general engineering
tasks, such as the maintenance of supply routes, aid in the
logistical support of combat forces.
It is evident that there are complex interactions
between engineer tasks and their effects upon time and
attrition. This observation might suggest the use of
multiple criteria decision making to resolve the engineer
resource allocation problem. This field has received consid-
erable attention in recent years and has proliferated a wide
variety of approaches toward reconciling differences in
desirability of feasible alternatives. However, a strong
case can be made to support the use of single objective
optimization techniques, as argued by Rosenthal [Ref. 13: p.
28] .
In this preliminary stage of model development, time
will be the principal criterion by which the feasibility and
preferability of alternative plans of engineer resource
allocation will be evaluated. Subsequent research on a
generalized value system may develop a utility function
which encompasses the criteria of time and attrition by
abstracting the concept of time to reflect the "tactical
difficulty" of a variant [Ref. 14].
Having selected time as the relevant decision vari-
able, only those engineer tasks which have a direct impact
on the duration of activities on the model's transportation
network will be represented. Thus, preliminary research
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emphasis will be placed on mobility and countermobility
tasks, with the latter case being the subject of the present
study. The survivability and general engineering mission
areas will be the subject of future research. Survivability
can be implicitly represented during defensive operations by
decrementing construction assets to reflect the fortifica-
tion of battalion task force battle positions. A corre-
sponding adjustment of attrition coefficients in the
formulation of Lanchester differential equations will then
be appropriate. Similarly, a prescribed quantity of engi-
neer effort can be assessed to maintain supply routes and
airfields in operational condition. Topographic missions
and the reorganization of engineers as infantry will not be
addressed.
The engineer planning model and the obstacle alloca-
tion model developed in subsequent chapters specifically
address the brigade countermobility mission. While the
models do not treat mobility missions, it is anticipated
that the general structure proposed will be readily adap-
table to such applications.
2. Tasks
The planning of engineer tasks within the Research
Model should consider the following tasks, the first three
of which are addressed by the present study.
1. Road blockage






6. * Minefield breaching
Frequently there are several combinations of engineer
systems and materials which can accomplish a task. For
example, a cross country route may be blocked by assigning
33
engineer squads to construct a minefield of sufficient size
or by tasking a team of bulldozers to construct an antitank
ditch. Additionally, a task may involve the accomplishment
of a set of activities. Thus another feasible method of
blocking a cross country route might involve the emplacement
of both a minefield and an antitank ditch. Each method would
in general consume different resources and impose dissimilar
time delays. Using taxonomy proposed in modelling efforts at
the Combat Engineer Research Laboratory (CERL) , each unique
method of completing a task is called a technique.
Techniques may involve a single job or multiple jobs and can
be defined in a rule based standard operating procedure
(SOP) table. [Ref. 15: p. 10]
D. RESOLUTION OF ENTITIES
This section specifies a selection of engineer entities
chosen for representation in the planning model. The enti-
ties are those necessary to achieve a rudimentary depiction
of the effect of the engineer system on battlefield
mobility. First, the nature and material requirements of
obstacles on the transportation network will be discussed.
This will serve to motivate the subsequent enumeration of
units and equipment necessary to emplace and surmount these
obstacles
.
The Airland Research Model will use the transportation
network as a generalized representation of terrain. The
network will be comprised of nodes and arcs which will have
attributes to describe ground mobility features such as
highways, bridges, fields, and rivers. The primary effect of
the engineer model on the simulation will be the modifica-
tion of these network attributes. The development of a
network structure is the subject of concurrent research
[Ref. 16]. A node represents a point in the x-y plane and
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thus has geometric location. Typically nodes will represent
such things as road junctions. Arcs connect nodes and thus
are line segments in the x-y plane. Arcs may possess a
variety of attributes which include such factors as length,
width and type. The following discussion establishes
requirements which the transportation network must satisfy
to support engineer planning.
1 . Obstacles
An obstacle may be defined as any obstuction which
stops, delays or restricts movement. Obstacles may be
categorized as either existing or reinforcing. Existing
obstacles consist of naturally occurring features such as
rivers and ravines, and cultural features such as villages
and canals. Reinforcing obstacles are obstructions created
through military effort which capitalize on existing
impediments. [Ref. 17: p. 2-2]
While obstacles may be employed in any military
operation, they are used most extensively in defensive
scenarios. Countermobility doctrine emphasizes three main
purposes for the use of reinforcing obstcles:
1. Enhance antitank weapon effectiveness.
2. Delay, disrupt, and attrite the enemy.
3. Enable economy of force actions.
The siting of obstacles is generally based on the location
of direct fire antitank weapons and is intended to hold
targets at maximum engagable ranges or divert them into
areas more favorable to the defender. Principal emphasis is
on obstacles which counter tank mobility. In this regard,
the minefield is often favored since it can cause tank casu-
alties independent of direct fire weapons. While the variety
of obstructions which can be employed is virtually limit-
less, four types of obstacle will be used in the model:
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1. The destroyed bridge.
2. The road crater.
3. The minefield.
4. The antitank ditch.
These obstacles will provide a cross section of the tactical
maneuver and combat engineering situations existent on the
AirLand battlefield.
a. Bridge Destruction
The destruction of a bridge can be a major
impediment to mobility. The transportation network should
reflect two bridging situations; the spanning of wet gaps
such as rivers and streams , and of dry gaps such as highway
underpasses and valleys. Three classes of bridge can be
considered by the model:
1. The four lane autobahn bridge.
2. The primary road bridge.
3. The secondary road bridge.
The mix of bridge situation and classification can present
unique mobility and countermobility requirements for the
engineer model.
The destruction of a bridge need not be complete
to serve a useful military purpose. Frequently it is neces-
sary to destroy only one span of a large bridge to force the
enemy onto an alternate route or to prompt the commitment of
his bridging assets. The representation of bridge destruc-
tion in the model will involve the allocation of a specified
number of bridge demolition packages and combat engineer
squads to the target bridge. A standard package will consist
of the explosives and expendable items necessary to destroy
a secondary road bridge. Other bridges will require a
multiple of such packages.
During mobility operations the engineer model
can plan for overcoming a destroyed bridge by one of the
following methods:
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1. Select an alternate route.
2. Conduct a hasty river crossing.
3. Erect a fixed span tactical bridge.
4. Construct an immediate bypass.
Some or all of the above methods may be infeasible within
the given situation and available engineer assets.
River crossings are complex operations which
involve the construction of combat trails to and from
crossing sites, the assembly of rafts and float bridges, and
the coordination of maneuver units and fire support. Such
crossings are both time and resource intensive and greatly
increase the vulnerability of crossing forces.
The erection of fixed bridging may be possible
if the gap is sufficiently short. The AVLB is generally
preferred if the gap is less than 57 feet. Other gaps would
require the use of MGB or Bailey bridge and the allocation
of engineer manpower.
The constuction of a bypass may be allowed by
the terrain in the case of a dry gap. The model would allo-
cate earthmoving assets such as bulldozers and scooploaders
to effect a modification of traf ficability parameters.
b. Road Crater
A road crater involves the explosive excavation
of a road surface and substructure. When properly placed and
reinforced with mines, it is an effective obstacle against
wheeled and tracked vehicles. Two methods of creating road
craters will be considered by the model:
1. The hasty road crater.
2. The M180 cratering kit.
The hasty road crater is emplaced by making
boreholes across the road at specified intervals, loading
them with explosives, and detonating them simultaneously.
The resulting crater is 20 to 25 feet across and 6 to 7 feet
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deep. The width is determined by the dimension of the road
to be obstructed. The explosives necessary for a hasty
crater on a secondary road will form a standard package. A
primary road or an autobahn will require several packages.
The M180 cratering kit is a self-contained
system which consists of a shaped charge for hole boring,
and a rocket propelled cratering charge mounted on a tripod.
Three to five kits are generally required to create a crater
with characteristics similar to those of the hasty method.
The M180 kit is frequently preferred over the hasty method
because it requires less time to prepare. An M180 standard
package will represent the number of kits required in
cratering a secondary road.
The engineer model can overcome the effects of a
road crater by one of the following means:
1. Select an alternate route.
2. Bridge the crater.
3. Fill the crater.
4. Create a bypass.
The AVLB will be the primary means of bridging a
crater. It will also be possible to use MGB to span the gap,
although such use is generally not time efficient. The
filling of a crater will involve the allocation of earth-
moving equipment such as the CEV , bulldozer, and
scooploader. The creation of a bypass will be situation
dependent and, in many cases, may not be possible. If the
crater is flanked by a minefield, breaching equipment would
be necessary.
c. Minefield
Mine warfare doctrine is evolving from the
concept of large linear minefields to the use of small mined
areas scattered across the battlefield. Both mine munitions
and the means of their delivery vary greatly. Conventional
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mines are explosive devices which may be mechanically or
hand emplaced in fixed or random patterns. Scatterable mines
are designed to self-destruct after a specified period of
inactivity and may be emplaced by ground dispensers,
artillery, or aircraft. Minefields created by either
conventional or scatterable means can be effective obstacles
against both personnel and armored vehicles. [Ref. 17: p.
5-2]
Minefields are categorized according to their
purpose and vary from those protecting fixed installations
to "phony" minefields designed to deceive the enemy. The
engineer model will employ two types of minefield:
1. Point minefields.
2. Tactical minefields.
The means of emplacement will be limited to conventional and
scatterable mines delivered by ground systems.
Point minefields are used to rapidly delay and
disrupt an enemy and to compliment the effect of other
obstacles. Brigade commanders are authorized to employ
point minefields and this authority may be delegated to the
battalion level [Ref. 3: p. 5-15]. The model will represent
two methods of making a point minefield. The first method
will be the hand emplacement of conventional mines by an
engineer squad. The munitions necessary to mine a secondary
road or another obstacle will form a point standard package.
The second method will involve the use of MOPMS ; a scatter-
able system which dispenses 21 antitank or antipersonnel
mines in a 35 meter radius semicircle. A MOPMS standard
package will consist of the kits necessary to create an
effect roughly equivalent to that of a point standard
p'ackage .
Tactical minefields are generally more extensive
than point minefields and hence require more time and
material assets to emplace. They may be used to stop or
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delay enemy attacks, block penetrations, deny withdrawl, and
prevent reinforcement. The division commander has the
authority to employ tactical minefields and this authority
may be delegated to the brigade level. [Ref. 17: p. 5-8]
Three means of creating a tactical minefield will be repre-
sented in the model; the hand emplaced MFJ standard pattern
minefield, the M57 mine dispensing system, and the GEMSS
scatterable minefield. In each case a standard package will
consist of the mine material necessary to emplace a 100
meter minefield.
The breaching of minefields by the engineer
model can be represented by the allocation of three types of
demolition kits. Antipersonnel minefields will be breached
by bangalore torpedo standard packages. The bangalore
torpedo kit consists of tubes of explosives which are
connected together and pushed into position by hand. Their
detonation clears a path approximately two feet in width.
Antitank minefields will be breached by allocation of either
an M157 or M173 standard package. The M157 demolition kit is
a tank emplaced line charge which clears a path four meters
wide and 90 meters long. The M173 kit is a rocket projected
line charge which creates a path 4.6 meters wide and 70
meters long. [Ref. 4: p. C-2]
d. Tank Ditch
Tank ditches are linear excavations which slow,
disrupt, and confuse the advance of attacking forces. The
effectiveness of a ditch depends on its dimensions, the soil
characteristics, and the type of vehicle attempting a
breach. While the design of tank ditches varies, the engi-
neer model will represent a standard rectangular ditch 3.3
meters across and 1.5 meters in depth. Such a ditch normally
imposes a five to ten minute delay on tracked vehicles in
the absence of engineer support. [Ref. 17: p. 6-28]
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The engineer model will allocate earthmoving
equipment such as bulldozers, scrapers, scooploaders and
CEVs to represent ditch construction. Normally, equipment
teams are formed to accomplish this task. A tank ditch
standard package will reflect the diesel fuel necessary for
a team of two bulldozers to construct 100 meters of ditch in
average soil. Such an excavation will generally require 1.5
hours [Ref. 17: p. 6-39].
While most tracked vehicles can eventually over-
come a tank ditch by wearing down its walls, engineer effort
can be allocated to speed the task. The engineer model can
assign earthmoving equipment or assault bridging such as the
AVLB to support ditch breaching.
e. Engineer Standard Packages
Table 1 summarizes the standard packages of























2 . Units and Equipment
To support the obstacle construction and destruction
tasks which will be modelled on the transportation network,
several system entities have been selected for explicit
representation. Units will be resolved to the combat engi-
neer squad level since squads are capable of independently
accomplishing many mobility and countermobility tasks. Major
items of equipment are frequently tasked individually or
combined to form teams, thus necessitating their individual
resolution.
Table 2 identifies the systems which will be repre-
sented in a divisional engineer battalion. Table 3, Table
4, and Table 5 specify the corps level systems which will









Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB)
Launcher
Bridge
Mobile Assault Bridge(MAB) Platoon- 2
Two 40m rafts/pit
or One 85m bridge/pit
M4T6 Bridge Platoon- 2
Two 16m rafts/pit
or Two 43m bridge/pit
(-NOTE: A division will have either MAB or M4T6)











Corps Engineer Combat Battalion
Entity Quantity










Scraper(18 cubic yard) 12
TABLE 5
Engineer Medium Girder Bridge Company
Entity Quantity
Medium Girder Bridge Platoon 2
Two 100ft brg/plt
or One 160ft brg/plt
E. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE TABLE
An SOP table will specify allowable combinations of
engineer system entities and material packages capable of
accomplishing a given task. The duration of the engineer
activity and a vector defining the expected delay value of
the task against various threats also will be contained in
the table.
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To show the conceptual format of the table, the case of
a two lane secondary road through a narrow defile will be
considered. The situation reflected on the transportation
network would indicate that off road mobility is not
possible. Such constrictions form ideal obstacle sites since
less material and effort are required to cause delays. Table
6 illustrates this case with hypothetical data. Future
research will be directed toward constructing the data base
required by the engineer planning model.
The use of an SOP table can be illustrated by explaining
the entries of the first row of Table 6. The first entry
specifies the type of obstruction which will be indicated on
the transportation network. Here, a standard road crater
will be designated. The next two entries specify the type
and quantity of engineer systems which must be allocated to
accomplish the task by this technique. Here, one combat
engineer squad must be dedicated to the job. The following
two entries indicate that one M180 engineer material stan-
dard package is necessary and will be expended in creating
the road crater. As specified next, the construction effort
will require the squad to remain on site for one hour.
The final series of entries represent the expected delay
in hours which the road crater will impose on any one of
several categories of units. These categories can reflect a
mix of inherent mobility characteristics and supporting
engineer availability. For example, category I could be a
wheeled transportation unit, while category II might repre-
sent the same unit with engineers in direct support.
Analogous categories could be tabled for armored and
mechanized forces.
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This chapter examined the engineer system and the issues
relevant to abstracting it into a conceptual model. The SOP
table provides a framework for discussing engineer resource
allocation in a more mathematically formal context. The next
chapter discusses the modelling of decisions within the
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The current goal of research in the Airland Model study-
effort is the development of a planning module which can
generate execution strategies. One approach is to employ a
game theoretic framework to select from among a finite set
of strategy options.
This chapter will discuss the use of a game theoretic
approach to decision making in planning. First, the role of
planning in the simulation will be discussed. Next, common
methods of modelling choice will be enumerated. Finally, a
brief introduction to the theory of games will be presented
with emphasis on the two person zero sum game.
B. PLANNING MODULE OVERVIEW
In the Airland Research Model the functions of planning
and the details of execution are divided into two distinct
modules. The planning module includes the decision algo-
rithms and thus must generate courses of action, select the
variant to be executed, and transmit the necessary instruc-
tions to the execution module. The planning module consists
of several submodules which reflect the planning functions
of each hierarchical level of the maneuver task force organ-
ization. Each combat support and combat service support
functional area will also be represented by a planning
submodule. [Ref . 2]
The eventual goal for the planning module is to have a
structure which can take general guidelines on the nature of
a mission and produce a detailed set of operating instruc-
tions. At present, the input will be specific mission
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instuctions designating the type of activity to be
conducted, the appropriate times and locations to be consid-
ered, and the threshold parameters which constrain the
problem. The continuing development of the functional area
planning submodules will identify the relevant parameters
and the submodules responsible for generating their values.
To illustrate the information flow in the Research Model, it
is helpful to examine the decision process in a generalized
stepwise sequence [Ref. 2].
1. Receive general mission guidance.
2. Formulate courses of action for each functional area.
3. Integrate all courses of action and conduct feasi-
bility checks
.
4. Iterate as necessary to insure feasibility.
5. Formulate a detailed operations order.
6. Develop execution instructions for each functional
area.
7. Pass control to the execution module.
8. Check decision thresholds for the operations order.
If violated return to step 1.
9. Check decision thresholds for aspects of the execu-
tion plan. If violated return to step 6.
10. Continue execution.
The present phase of Model development is directed toward




In virtually all simulations of conflict that are
complex enough to be useful, there are decisions that
must be modelled. How these decisions are modelled
frequently has a major impact on the results of the
simulation [Ref. 6: p. 237].
In the construction of models of conflict great pains
are often taken to model hardware in explicit detail with
the belief that such efforts will naturally result in a
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superior simulation. The representation of decisions may be
of secondary interest to the modeller and thus receive
little attention. The difficulty with this situation is that
simulations are often used to determine or validate policy.
The inability to accurately model employment choices may
lead to analyses which misrepresent the capabilities of the
hardware and thus result in flawed doctrine.
In the modelling of ground combat there is a wide
variety of decisions which must be portrayed at each hier-
archical level. These choices may include: what unit to
move, where and when to move, what units to hold in reserve,
what route to use, and how to employ supporting assets. The
answers to these questions are often written into the logic
of the model in such a manner that the range of research
issues for which the model may be used is unnecessarily
limited. It is therefore useful to conduct a brief survey of
decision modelling methodologies. The following methods
will be considered:
1. Game theoretic with a global objective
2. Optimization algorithm with a local goal
3. Decisions based on expected opposition
4. Decisions based on simple rules
5. Modelling human decision making
6. Decisions by human interaction
1 . Game Theoretic
In the game theoretic approach one attempts to make
an optimal decision in accordance with a global measure of
ef fectiveness (MOE) . The MOE is the overall decision
criterion for the conflict, for example the outcome of a
battle, and not for a specific engagement in the battle. One
selection method involves the use of linear programming to
describe an optimal course of action from among all allo-
wable options. The advantage of this method is that it
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gives the best indication of what each side in the conflict
can do. The disadvantage is that in most situations of
interest the number of options far exceeds the ability to
enumerate them. Thus the simulation is forced to be rela-
tively simple, and perhaps less believable to a decision-
maker. An alternative method is to construct a reduced set
of choices for each side in the conflict and determine the
game theoretic solution for a more detailed simulation. The
problem is that in the reduction of options, one may omit




This method involves the use of a mathematical
programming technique such as linear, nonlinear, or dynamic
programming, to optimize a local MOE . For example, this
method may pursue the goal of maximizing attrition to the
enemy as a means toward the end of winning the campaign.
This method is usually not optimal in the game theoretic
sense. To the extent that the algorithm chosen reflects
decisions consistent with military judgement, it may be
useful. However, because the method is a sub-optimization,
it can result in decisions far from the global optimum. In
general one may not know the quality of the choices made.




In this method one attempts to gain intelligence as
to what the opponent will do and then constructs countering
strategies. The method may involve the formulation of fixed
rules or of algorithms with parameters chosen to reflect the
opponents tactics. While the method attempts to optimize
against the perceived intent of the opponent , it does not




This method employs decision rules the effect of
which varies monotonically with a global MOE . For example,
suppose that it is accepted that the slower a force is
caused to move, the better the defender's outcome will be. A
simple rule could be formulated which prescribes the appli-
cation of more obstacles along an enemy avenue of advance.
A problem is that while such a rule might appear to be mono-
tonic, it may not. In the above example one could argue
that creating extensive delays along one route might divert
the enemy to an adjacent, less capable defender resulting in
a defeat. The difficulty with simple rules is that demon-
strating them to be monotonic may be as difficult as proving
optimality. Monotonic behavior occurs if all decisions are
game- theoretic optimal. However, this fact is of little
practical value in determining decision rules. The advan-
tage of this method is that simple rules are easy to under-
stand and explain. However the effect of the rule in the
simulation may not be readily evident. [Ref. 6: p. 248]
5 Modelling Human Decisions
This method describes attempts to categorize the
reponse of some desirable class of human decision makers
over a wide range of situations. Statistical techniques may
be used to define median responses to a tactical problem.
The method does not in general provide optimal decisions,
but may yield consistently reasonable ones. At the current
time this method has found little application in large scale




This method uses human gamers to interact with the
simulation and make decisions. The advantage of this
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approach is that complex decisions are often hard to auto-
mate, even when the goal is not optimality. There are disad-
vantages to this method. The training of gamers may be quite
time consuming and many may be required to get results that
depend on the issues under study and not game playing
skills. Secondly, the long playing times of such games often
insures that only a few variants will be examined. [Ref. 6:
p. 249]
Two observations appear relevant. If it is deter-
mined that the answers to issues are likely to be the same
over a wide range of situations, monotonic rules are desir-
able since they permit a more detailed model to be used.
However, if the decisions made are likely to produce
different results, the game theoretic approach is prefer-
able. Due to the difficulty of projecting the effect of
decisions against an active opponent in AirLand warfare, the
use of game theory will be pursued further.
D. GAME THEORY OVERVIEW
The theory of games can provide an optimal method for
making planning decisions, given the situation can be formu-
lated into a game theoretic context. In general, one wishes
to know which of several available employment options should
be exercised in view of an opponent's capabilities. This
section will introduce the concepts necessary to discuss the
application of game theory to decision making in the alloca-
tion of engineer resources.
1 . Definitions
a. Game
A game may be described as a conflict situation
among N players conducted under a prescribed set of rules
with known rewards. The rules define the elementary activi-
ties or moves of the game. [Ref. 7: p. 184]
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b. Two Person Zero Sum(TPZS) Game
This game is characterized by two players whose
interests are in complete opposition. That is, what one
player wins, the other losses. Such conflicts are also
called matrix games. The TPZS game is the mathematically
most well developed of a wide spectrum of conflict situ-
ations in that it is possible to unambiguously describe a
game solution.
c. Strategy.
A pure strategy is a predetermined plan that
prescribes for a player the sequence of moves and counter-
moves made during a complete game. Thus, it is a complete
rule for decision making.
d. Payoff
A payoff is the numerical value received or lost
corresponding to each alternative of the other player in a
TPZS game. All payoffs are tabulated in a matrix where the
rows and columns represent the strategy choices of the two
players. By convention, payoffs are made to the row player
who attempts to maximize his minimum level of gain.
Conversely, the column player seeks to minimize his maximum
loss .
e. Complete Information
A basic assumption of any game is that all
players are aware of the extensive form of the game, that
is, they are aware of all the legal moves at each stage of
the game and of the probability distributions involved.
Additionally, they understand the utility which the outcomes




By this concept it is meant that each player
knows at all times the precise state of the game including
the past history of moves . This is to say that nothing is
concealed from the player when a choice is made. Often games
present situations where a choice must be made in the
absence of such knowledge. These are said to be games of
imperfect information. [Ref. 8: p. 19]
g. Normal Form
The normal form of a TPZS game is a formulation
where the strategies are enumerated and the payoff matrix is
expressed. The two players each choose a pure strategy
unaware of the other's choice. [Ref. 8: p. 23]
h. Dominance
A strategy can be eliminated from a player's set
of options if there is another strategy in the set which is
always at least as good regardless of what the opponent
does. The eliminated strategy is said to be dominated and
would never be used by a rational player.
i. Saddle Point
If each player has a single best pure strategy,
then the intersection represents a saddle point and the
payoff is called the value of the game, v*. The two strat-
egies are said to be optimal pure strategies and would be
used by rational players every time since they ensure the
payoff V-, which is the best either player can expect.
j . Mixed Strategy
A TPZS game which does not have a saddle point
has no solution in pure strategies. One can generalize the
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concept of solution to include a probability distribution on
the set of pure strategies for a player. In accordance with
the MINIMAX theorem, every finite TPZS game has optimal
mixed strategy vectors xj^ and y_2 and a game value v- . Thus,
a player makes a choice between pure strategies regulated by
chance. This use of randomization in the choice of a course
of action results in a lack of absolute predictability on
the part of either opponent. This latter point assumes the
existance of at least two non-zero elements in both xj^ and
2f. [Ref. 8: p. 31]
k. Bimatrix Game
In the TPZS game it was assumed that the two
players' goals are in direct conflict. Generally, the inter-
ests of the two players may not be exactly opposed. This
implies that one player may value the loss of one unit of
payoff in a manner different than his opponent. Often coop-
eration between the players could result in greater returns
than if each acted only in their own interest. Cooperation
may be prohibited by the rules of the game. Such a situation
is called a noncooperative bimatrix game. In general, the
solution to such a game is controversial since each player
may have his own preferred solution which, if pursued, could
be worse for both. [Ref. 8: p. 78]
2. TPZS Solution Method
Linear programming provides a powerful method for
determining the solution to a finite TPZS game in normal
form. To illustrate the formulation of such a game,
consider a conflict in which row player I has m pure
strategies and column player II has n such strategies.
Since I is the maximizing player, he will attempt to
maximize his minimum gain, v, subject to n inequality
constraints. These state that the average payoff to I is at
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least v when II uses one of his n stategies and I uses mixed
strategy x. Additionally, x is constrained to be a proper
probability distribution. The solution to this program, v*
and X" , represents the game value and I's optimal mixed
strategy. The dual to this formulation yields II' s optimal
mixed strategy, y_2, and the same game value, v*. This
latter fact is the essence of the MINIMAX theorem.
[Ref. 10: p. 31]
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V. BRIGADE ENGINEER PLANNING MODEL
The purpose of this chapter is to present an algorithm
which employs a TPZS game formulation as a decision model
for selecting a brigade obstacle plan in the Airland
Research Model. The algorithm will be referred to as a
brigade engineer planning model and in general could be
formulated to support either the mobility or the countermo-
bility mission of engineers supporting a brigade. The
mobility formulation will be the subject of future research
and will not be considered further.
A. BACKGROUND
The brigade provides a convenient point of departure for
the discussion of engineer planning. First, the basic level
of unit resolution in the Research Model is the battalion
task force. Choosing a middle level hierarchical unit such
as the brigade permits a general discussion of the linkages
between its superior and subordinate units; the division and
battalion task force, respectively. Second, it is at the
brigade level that detailed obstacle plans are prepared
[Ref. 17: p. 4-6]. Corps and division obstacle plans are
primarily a means for transmitting a "countermobiliy
concept" to subordinate units [Ref. 17: p. 4-5]. These
higher level plans also specify allocations of obstacle
materials and additional engineer units which are deemed
necessary for the brigade to successfully execute the inten-
tions of the corps and the division.
A brigade conducting a defend or delay mission is
normally supported by a divisional combat engineer company
which is placed in direct support. This company is usually
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augmented by the divisional engineer battalion with addi-
tional resources such as engineer platoons, earthmoving
equipment, and obstacle material. The brigade engineer must
allocate both organic and supplemental assets to the
battalion task force sectors within the brigade to best
support the countermobility mission of obstructing enemy
maneuver. In addition, the brigade engineer issues guidance
to his subordinate engineers concerning the type of threat
against which the obstacle plan is to be constructed and the
time available for its emplacement.
Because planning decisions concerning obstacle prepara-
tion must be made hours or days in advance of the battle,
the specific enemy configuration which will confront the
brigade is often uncertain. However, it is possible for the
division to identify for the brigade the type of threat
which may maneuver into the brigade sector during the
current planning cycle. From this information, it is
possible to enumerate a range of tactical options which the
enemy could employ in negotiating the brigade sector.
Similarly, the enemy is uncertain as to how the
defending brigade" will prepare the sector with obstacles.
The organization, capabilities, and doctrine of the brigade
are known to the enemy, as is the terrain in the sector. The
enemy must plan for the deployment of its forces well in
advance of encountering the brigade. In general, it is not
until the enemy actually arrives at the sector and conducts




In the Airland Research Model it will be necessary to
abstract the preceding situation into a mathematical formu-
lation which can specify an allocation of engineer resources
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to support the countermobiliy mission. It is proposed that
a TPZS game be the decision model from which engineer and
enemy employment strategies are selected for implementation.
The convention of referring to the defending engineer force
as Blue and the attacking enemy force as Red will be adopted
for clarity.
The brigade engineer planning model is an algorithm
which takes input from the Research Model, formulates and
solves the engineer and enemy allocation problems as a game,
and selects a course of action for each. The following
assumptions are pertinent to the game construct:
1. The possible Red attack options are known to Blue and
the Blue obstacle allocation options are known to
Red.
2. Both Red and Blue use the same criterion in the
calculation of payoff values for the game and their
objectives are completely opposed.
3. Both Red and Blue make their allocation decisions at
the same time. This assumption can be generalized to
state that at the times that decisions are made,
neither opponent has any advantage over the other
concerning information about the game.
In brief, the game is formulated in the following
manner. Each Blue engineer strategy B(i); i= 1 to m, repre-
sents a unique allocation of available engineer assets "among
the battalion task force sectors which results in a brigade
obstacle plan. A sector defines a portion of the transpor-
tation network and corresponds to the military concept of an
avenue of approach . The Blue obstacle plan is not modified
in response to Red's allocation decision and thus is a one
stage strategy. Each Red enemy strategy R(j ) ; j = 1 to n, is
a unique assignment of available enemy units to avenues of
approach. This assignment is not changed in response to
Blue's decision. However, Red is assummed to learn the
obstacle plan upon encountering the brigade sector and
therefore selects the minimum time path. Thus, Red plays a
two stage strategy. Each payoff value a(i,j) is a weighted
average of the expected minimum transit times of Red units
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through the interdicted sectors to which they are assigned.
The obstacle interdictions are specified by an obstacle
allocation model discussed in Chapter VI.
It is clear that a more comprehensive brigade game could
be formulated with strategies involving many factors other
than those specifically concerning engineers. For example,
it may be argued that the positioning of battalion task
forces within the brigade could be specified by the strat-
egies as could the definition of sector boundaries dividing
those units. Ostensibly, any variable defined to be
controlled by the brigade could be used in generating strat-
egies. However, for the purposes of the brigade engineer
planning model, the locations of battalion task forces and
their sector boundaries will be derived as input from a
detailed operations order.
C. MODEL INPUT
During the execution of operations within the Research
Model, events will occur which trigger the issuance of new
instructions to subordinate units. The question of how
operations orders can be dynamically generated within the
Model is a topic of active research. One approach is to
employ generic mission "templates" which configure comba-
tants to fit with the terrain and specify unit missions.
The Engineer Planning Model will require several items of
information once a countermobility mission is specified.
1 . Planning Horizon
The time available to perform obstacle construction
tasks must be specified in the operations order to the
brigade. This time period should reflect an interval from
the receipt of the the mission to the anticipated arrival
time of an enemy unit at the forward boundary of the brigade
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sector. For plannning purposes it is required that all
obstacle interdictions to the network be completed within
this period. This simplification avoids calculating unique
arrival times for the enemy at each potential obstacle site
and reduces the computational effort necessary to establish
the feasibility of an interdiction.
2 . Unit Sectors
The spatial distribution of units on the battlefield
must be established as input down to and including battalion
task force sectors. As previously mentioned, such sectors
sit astride likely enemy avenues of approach and therefore
delineate sections of the transportation network of interest
for obstacle interdiction. The methodology for subdividing
a general network into sub-networks is a key issue in temp-
late research. The current approach is based upon identi-
fying natural terrain compartmentalizations which lead to
specifying independent transportation networks for each
sector.
The use of minimum transit time through a sector as
a payoff criterion implies the existence of a unique set of
local source and sink nodes at the front and rear of each
battalion sector. Otherwise, multiple minimum paths of
different values could be said to exist along an avenue of
approach. A problem of definition exists in identifying for
the model which node to select as a source or sink. In
general, the sector network as defined by the templating
procedure may not contain obvious candidate nodes for this
selection. One possible solution could be to create a
notional node, to represent a source or sink when no existing
node satisfied that purpose. Dummy arcs of zero cost could
then connect the notional node to existing nodes at or near
the sector boundaries. Figure 5.1 illustrates a typical
brigade sector for conducting a delay operation along three
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avenues of approach. Each avenue is defended by a battalion
task force and is treated as an independent interdiction
problem by the obstacle allocation model.
Each avenue of approach (AA) is a
Blue battalion sector and defines an
independent portion of the transportation
network. Each dashed circle is a target
site for potential interdiction.
Figure 5 . 1 Typical Brigade Sector
3 . Enemy Strategies
Types and numbers of enemy forces opposing the
brigade and the rules by which strategy can be formed or
eliminated must be input to the model. Each Red strategy is
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a different assignment of forces to avenues of approach
through the battalion sectors. Thus, if a Red motorized
rifle division (MRD) contained four motorized rifle regi-
ments (MRR) which are assigned to three avenues of approach,
there will be twelve possible assignments, assuming each MRR
is indistinguishable from the other. These Red strategies
are 3-tuples of integers corresponding to the number of MRRs
assigned to each avenue. The first Red strategy might place
all four MRRs on the first avenue and would be represented
notationally as R(l) = (4,0,0). The second Red strategy,
R(2) = (3,1,0), would represent three MRRs on the first
avenue and one on the second, and so on. In general, enemy
strategies would be k- tuples of integers, where k is the
number of avenues of approach through the brigade sector,
and where the sum of the integers is equal to the number of
enemy subunits in the Red force. The enumeration of Red
strategies R(j) can continue for all possible allocations of
enemy subunits to avenues.
For the purposes of this model, the Red force allo-
cated to an avenue of approach is treated as a single entity
with unique mobility characteristics. Therefore, the minimum
time path associated with, for example, three MRRs on a
given avenue will in general have a different value that if,
say, one MRR were assigned to the same avenue. This distinc-
tion permits the model to represent situations where larger
forces may move more slowly than smaller forces but may
negotiate obstacles more effectively due to the pooling of
breaching assets.
Generating strategies by combinatorial enumeration
could cause the size of the game to increase beyond the
bound of computational feasibility. The potential game
matrix can be reduced by excluding from consideration any
strategies which are deemed to be "militarily unsound". This
amounts to determining a priori which strategies will be
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dominated by others in a strategy set. While there is no
guarantee that a set of such rules can be found, it may be
possible to identify rules which are generally reliable. An
example of such a rule might be to exclude from considera-
tion any Red strategy which placed all four MRRs on a single
avenue of approach. The rule could reflect the limited
ability of the terrain in a single sector to support the
movement of an entire division. The generation of such
rules is an integral part of the current templating research
for the Research Model. There is an obvious tradeoff
between computational feasibility and theoretical accuracy
which must be resolved by an examination of empirical
evidence
.
4 . Engineer Strategies
The engineer assets available to the brigade must be
specified as input to the model. As previously mentioned,
each Blue strategy is a unique brigade obstacle plan. This
plan is actually composed of a number of smaller network
interdiction plans, one for each battalion sector (avenue of
approach) within the brigade. Each sector interdiction is
determined by the use of the obstacle allocation model
presented in Chapter VI. This model iteratively assigns
available engineer assets to obstacle sites (targets) along
the minimum time path between a source node and a sink node
within the sector. Varying the input to the obstacle allo-
cation model causes a new sector interdiction plan to be
generated, resulting in a different brigade obstacle plan
and hence a different engineer strategy. Within any one
game, only the allocation of engineer resources to a sector
is varied in enumerating engineer strategies.
Engineer resources which may be allocated to inter-
dict battalion sector networks include assets organic to the
engineer company such as the three combat engineer platoons,
64
and supplemental assets, such as equipment teams and
obstacle materials from the parent engineer battalion. To
reduce the combinatorial problem of enumerating the possible
allocations of resources to sectors, supplemental assets
will be aggregated into standardized augmentation packages .
One such package might consist of one dozer/loader team, one
corps combat engineer platoon, a platoon basic load of
obstacle standard packages , and a CEV from the engineer
company. The composition and quantity of augmentation pack-
ages must be input as data to the model.
Consider a Blue brigade engineer company which
consists of three organic platoons and has received one
augmentation package. If the brigade sector contains three
avenues of approach, there are thirty unique allocations of
these four resources to the sectors. This assumes that the
three organic platoons are indistinguishable from each
other. At this point, Blue engineer strategies could also be
represented as 3-tuples, each term specifying the assets to
be allocated to an avenue. Let the first Blue strategy be to
assign all three platoons and the augmentation package to
the first avenue. This can be represented notationally as
B(l) = (3+A,0,0); where the 3+A indicates that all assets
are allocated to the first avenue. A second strategy can be
to assign one organic platoon to each avenue and reinforce
the second with the augmentation package; B(2) = (1,1+A,1).
In a similiar manner all thirty distinguishable allocations
can be enumerated.
Blue strategies could be further extended by consid-
ering not only asset - to- sector allocations, but also the Red
force against which to plan in each sector. For the case of
twelve Red strategies and thirty Blue allocation strategies
this fuller enumeration process would result in 360 extended
Blue strategies. Such a procedure could be computationally
prohibitive for at least two reasons. First, the number of
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engineer allocation strategies can grow rapidly as more
augmentation packages are made available to the brigade.
For example, if another package were available in the
previous example the number of Blue strategies would
increase by threefold. Second, to generate a payoff for a k
sector problem the obstacle allocation model must be
employed up to k times (if engineers are to be allocated to
all k sectors). Thus, both the potential size of the game
matrix and the expense in computing payoff values necessi-
tates the consideration of further simplifying assumptions.
The obstacle allocation model presented in Chapter
VI requires that an enemy force be specified for planning
purposes. Rather then letting this input vary as a parameter
in each Blue engineer strategy, a single generic Red force
will be used for the entire game. Thus, if the divisional
order to the brigade identified an MRD as the opponent,
planning could be done against a "motorized rifle force" as
opposed to say, a "tank force". This compromise is not hard
to accept, since in reality obstacle plans are predicated
primarily on enemy type as opposed to enemy configuration.
5 . Aggregation Function
An aggregation function must be specified as input
to the brigade engineer planning model. For each possible
pairing of opposing engineer and enemy strategies, a single
payoff value a(i,j) must be calculated. Minimum enemy
transit time through an interdicted sector is the criterion
of interest. However, the brigade obstacle interdiction
problem will generally contain multiple independent inter-
diction subproblems, each corresponding to an avenue of
approach through the brigade. Thus a scheme to aggregate the
several possible minimum transit times into a unique payoff
value is necessary. One simplistic approach is to calculate
the arithmetic mean of all the minimum transit times. This
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method has the advantage that it is easy to calculate and
interpret. However, this method loses any information
concerning the variance of the transit times, which could be
as significant to a military decision maker as the mean
value
.
An alternative method is to introduce a relative
weighting scheme. For a given combination of a Blue
strategy B(i) and a Red strategy R( j ) , weights w(q); q=l to
p, p^k, can be applied to each of the p expected minimum
transit times of the enemy through the brigade, where a Red
strategy may use some or all of the k sectors (avenues)
within the brigade. The weights would be subject to the
constraints
:
< w(q) < 1
, Y,
w ^) = 1 *
q
One approach is to take a weighted average of the sector
transit times based on the rank order of those times. Thus,
the quickest transit time could be weighted by a factor
W(l), the second quickest by W(2), and so on. The number of
weights, p, would correspond to the number of sectors which
the enemy used in traversing through the brigade. If the
division was solely concerned with the minimum time of the
first enemy unit exiting the brigade sector, then W(l) would
be set to 1 and W(2) through W(p) would be set to 0. If
interest was focused on how long the entire enemy force
would take to traverse the brigade sector, then the time
associated with the slowest unit could be weighted by the
factor W(p) = 1.
Another weighting scheme can be based on the
percentage of the total Red force that enemy elements on
each avenue of approach represent. Such an aggregation can
be interpreted as reflecting the conventional military
wisdom of "arriving as quickly as possible with as much as
possible." Consider an example where a Red motorized rifle
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division (MRD) consisting of four motorized rifle regiments
(MRR) will negotiate a Blue brigade sector consisting of
three avenues of approach. One option would be to place two
MRRs on the first avenue and one MRR on each of the last two
avenues. Assume that an obstacle plan has been specified
for each avenue and that the resulting minimum transit times
for the Red units on those avenues are t(l), t(2), and t(3)
respectively. Then the payoff could be expressed as the
weighted sum:
a(i,j) = .50t(l) + .25t(2) + .25t(3)
While this method is simple for threats composed of
identical subunits , difficulty arises in assigning weights
within heterogeneous forces. For example, if the previously
mentioned MRD consisted of three MRRs and a tank regiment
(TR) the problem of assigning weights is nontrivial since
the relative value of a MRR verses a TR is not self evident.
This difficulty must be resolved through the establishment
of a generalized value system within the Research Model.
For the present discussion, the proportional weighting
scheme will be employed and weights will be input to the
brigade engineer planning model.
D. GAME STRUCTURE
1 . Formulation
Having established the relationships which are
pertinent to both the Red and Blue forces, it is possible to
formulate the allocation planning problem as a TPZS game.
The Blue strategies B(i); i=l to m and Red strategies R(j )
;
.j=l to n each represent a k-tuple asset- to- sector allocation
and are determined by the enumeration of possible combina-
tions and the elimination of "militarily unsound" options as
previously discussed.
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The payoff function is more difficult to summarize.
It is actually a multiple step algorithm which plans the
allocation of Blue engineer assets to interdict sector
networks, and evaluates the minimum time path for Red units
traversing the sectors. The times corresponding to those
paths are aggregated into a single payoff value by the
application of an aggregation function. A more detailed
discussion of payoff values follows.
For a Blue strategy B(i), the brigade obstacle plan
is specified by employing the obstacle allocation model of
Chapter VI to assign the assets in B(i) to interdictable
target sites. This assignment process is repeated for each
of the k sectors in the brigade. A Red strategy R( j ) is
then paired with B(i), the corresponding terms of each
k-tuple constituting an assignment of a Red force consisting
of Red subunits against a Blue sector obstacle plan. This
assignment identifies enemy and obstacle indices which
permit arc time cost parameters and obstacle delay values to
be read from Research Model data files. The sector networks
are then initialized with these values. The time cost for
each arc is the sum of the enemy's travel time were the arc
not interdicted, plus the delay times associated with any
obstacles assigned to the arc. The minimum time path is
determined between source and sink nodes for each sector to
which a Red force is assigned. Thus, a p-tuple of times is
determined where p<k. Finally, the proportional value aggre-
gation function is applied to determine the payoff value
a(i,j) as a weighted sum of the p-tuple of times.
The process of determining payoff values is
continued by pairing the current B(i) against another Red
strategy and reinitializing the arc time cost parameters and
obstacle delay values to reflect the change in enemy config-
uration. Once all n Red strategies have been paired against
B(i) and payoffs have been calculated, the next Blue
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strategy is selected and a new brigade obstacle plan is
determined. This procedure continues until payoffs have been
determined for all pairings of B(i) and R(j )
.
With the strategies enumerated and the payoff values
expressed, the game is in normal form. Figure 5.2 illus-
trates the format of the corresponding game matrix. Blue is
the maximizing player since its objective is to delay Red
for as long as it can. Conversely, Red is the minimizing
player since it seeks to penetrate the brigade as quickly as
possible with as much as possible.
2 . Solution
The game in normal form can be solved as a linear
program as was discussed in Chapter IV. The formulation of
this program for Blue is straightforward and appears as
Figure 5.3. The solution to this program is v* and xj^ =
x( 1)", x(2 )*
,
. . . ,x(m)'v
,
where the game value v* represents
the expected payoff to Blue given that it uses its optimal
mixed strategy x*'c . Additionally, the dual to this formula-
tion yields yj^ = y ( 1)* ,y (2 )-,... ,y (n)* which is Red's
optimal mixed strategy.
The specific course of action which Blue should
pursue can now be determined by sampling a pseudo- random
deviate from a uniform(0,l) distribution and making an
appropriate comparison with the distribution xj^ . Once a
pure strategy B(i) has been selected, the brigade obstacle
plan which it represents can be transmitted to the Research
Model execution module for implementation. Likewise, a pure
strategy can be selected for Red by sampling a new pseudo-
random deviate and making a comparison against the
distribution y* .
The procedure outlined above envisions the use of a
linear programming routine which is passed the m by n game
matrix and which returns the indices for the Blue and Red
70
RED(min)







a(l,l) a(l,2) .... a(l,n)




a(m,l) a(m,2) .... a(m,n)
Figure 5.2 Planning Game Matrix
Maximize
Subject to:
L. a(i,j)x(i) - v > for j = 1 to n
i
I x(i) = 1
x(l) , x(2) , . . .
,
x(m) >
Figure 5.3 Blue Game Formulation.
pure strategies to be implemented. Computational efficien-
cies may be achieved by exploiting two principles of the
TPZS game prior to formulating the linear program.
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The concept of dominance may be employed to elimi-
nate from consideration any Red or Blue strategy which is
completely dominated by another strategy in the same set.
Such a procedure can be done without fear of eliminating
useful strategies and may reduce the computational effort
necessary to solve the game. Extensive dominance may be
common in the situations encountered by the model and thus
it may be possible to substantially reduce the average size
of the games solved. Similarly, a search for a saddle point
may prove to save computational resources if such an occur-
rence is found to be common within the games formulated.
E. MODEL ALGORITHM
The preceding discussion established the inputs and
elements of the brigade engineer planning model. This
section is a reiteration which presents the brigade engineer
planning model as a sequential algorithm.
1. Receive a brigade countermobility mission and input
the time available, each of k sector networks, the
enemy forces, strategy elimination rules, engineer
assets, and the aggregation function.
2. Determine Red and Blue strategies by enumerating
k-tuples of assets and disregarding strategies in
accordance with the elimination rules.
3. Determine the brigade obstacle plan for a Blue
strategy. First, select one of the k sectors in the
brigade and activate the obstacle allocation model to
determine a sector plan. This allocation model will
require the following input: time horizon, engineer
assets alloted to the sector (a term of the Blue
strategy k-tuple), the generic Red force against
which to plan, and the sector network including all
interdictable target sites and arc time cost parame-
ters for the generic force. Second, record the
planned interdictions to targets on the sector
network. Third, repeat this procedure until all k
sectors have been considered.
4. Calculate a p- tuple of enemy minimum transit times
through the brigade. First, identify the Red force
assigned to a sector. Second, initialize the arc
time cost parameters and obstacle delay values to
reflect the Red force. Third, calculate the minimum
time path through the sector network between desig-
nated source and sink nodes. Fourth, repeat this
procedure until all p sectors assigned Red units are
considered.
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5. Calculate a payoff value by applying the aggregation
function to the p-tuple of times from Step 4. Repeat
Steps 3 through 5 until all m Blue strategies and all
n Red strategies are considered.
6. Scan the payoff matrix for dominated strategies and
eliminate them from further consideration. Scan again
for a saddle point and skip to Step 9 if one is
found
.
7. Solve the game by linear programming as a maximiza-
tion problem for Blue and record the optimal strategy
vector xj^. Determine the dual to this formulation
and record the Red optimal strategy vector y
-
.
8. Select a pure strategy for Blue by sampling from a
uniform(0,l) distribution and comparing the sampled
value against the optimal strategy vector x* . Repeat
this procedure for Red using y* .
9. Pass the selected Blue brigade obstacle plan and the
Red attack configuration to the Research Model execu-
tion module and terminate the algorithm.
F . EXAMPLE
1 . Input
Consider again the brigade sector depicted in Figure
5.1 and assume that a delay mission has been issued to the
defending force. In 8 hours a Red MRD with 4 MRRs is
expected to encounter this sector which is composed of 3
avenues of approach(AA) . It is established that AA1 and AA3
can each support at most 2 MRRs while AA2 can support only 1
MRR. The available Blue engineer assets consist of 3 combat
engineer platoons each with a basic load of obstacle
material, and 1 augmentation package consisting of 1 combat
engineer squad with 2 bridge standard packages and 1 dozer
team with 2 diesel fuel standard packages. Due to the short
preparation time, each of the 3 platoons is to remain in its
present sector. However, the augmentation package may be
allocated to any of the 3 sectors. The Blue division has
determined that each of the MRRs is similarly equipped and




The Red and Blue strategies are 3-tuples repre-
senting asset- to- sector allocations and are only partially
enumerated due to the issuance of strategy elimination
rules. The Red strategies are: R(l)=(2,l,l) and
R(.2)=(l,l,2) . The Blue strategies are: B ( 1 ) = ( 1 + A, 1 , 1 ) ,
B(2)=(l,l+A,l), and B ( 3 ) = ( 1 , 1 , 1+A)
.
3 Obstacle Plans
The obstacle allocation model is employed to produce
obstacle plans for each sector in accordance with each Blue
strategy. This model is the subject of Chapter VI where an
illustrative example considers the development of the sector
plan for AA2 under Blue strategy B(2).
4 Minimum Transit Times
The p-tuple of enemy minimum transit times through
the battalion sectors are presented in Figure 5.4. Since the
Red strategies both employ all 3 avenues of approach, p=k=3
for all cases. The calculation of the second term of the
p-tuple (17.5, 9, 14) for the case of R(l) verses B(2) is




The aggregation function specified by the input
scenario has established equal weights for all the MRRs
.
Therefore each represents one fourth of the value of the
MRD . The following equations specify the payoff values
corresponding to each of the 3-tuples in Figure 5.4.












, 1,1) (1, I, 2)
(28.0, 6, 14) (20, 6, 18.0)
(17.5, 9, 14) (19, 9, 18.0)
(17.5, 6, 15) (19, 6, 18.5)
Figure 5.4 Enemy Minimum Transit Times
a(l,l): .50(28.0) + .25(6) + .25(14) = 19.0
a(2,l): .50(17.5) + .25(9) + .25(14) -= 14.5
a(3,l): .50(17.5) + .25(6) + .25(15) = 14.0
a(l,2): .25(20) + .25(6) + .50(18.0) = 15.5
a(2,2): .25(19) + .25(9) + .50(18.0) = 16.0







6 . Matrix Scan
A check for dominated strategies reveals that the
payoff values associated with B(3) are both less than or
equal to all other values in the same columns. Therefore,
B(3) is dominated by B(l) and B(2) and may be eliminated












Figure 5.5 Payoff Matrix.
the game. A check for a saddle point reveals none and thus
the game must have a solution in mixed strategies.
7 . Game Solution
The solution to the game can be determined by linear
programming as previously discussed. The formulation for
Blue is shown in Figure 5.6. The solution to this program
is x(l)-=.30 and x(2)*=.70 and the value of the game is
V"=15.85. The dual to this program yields the Red optimal
mixed strategy y(l)*=.10 and y(2)*=.90.
8 Strategy Selection
To select the specific Blue and Red strategies to be
transmitted to the execution module it is necessary to
sample twice from a pseudo-random number generator. Suppose
that this has been done and that the values are u(l)=.1018
for Blue and u(2)=.7365 for Red. Since u(l) falls between
0.00 and 0.30, strategy B(l) is selected for Blue.
Similarly, u(2) falls between 0.10 and 1.00 and thus





19.0x(l) + 14.5x(2) - v >
15.5x(l) + 16.0x(2) - v >
x(l) + x(2) = 1
x(l), x(2) >
Figure 5.6 Game Formulation.
9 . Execution Instructions
The selection of strategy B(l) for Blue determines
that the augmentation package will be allocated to the
sector containing AA1 . The obstacle plan corresponding to
this assignment of assets must either be retrieved from
temporary storage or the plan must be regenerated by the
obstacle allocation model. The Red strategy R(2) is more
easily interpreted and the vector (1,1,2) can be sent to the
execution module.
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VI. OBSTACLE ALLOCATION MODEL
A. GENERAL
The purpose of the obstacle allocation model is to
specify a feasible allocation plan which supports the coun-
termobility mission of interdicting the transportation
network. Once the network interdiction plan has been speci-
fied, expected travel times can be determined for units of
interest. These times can be used in defining a payoff
value for a cell of the game matrix discussed in Chapter V.
Input to the model is an array corresponding to a Blue
strategy. In addition, the model will access specific data
bases such as those which represent the transportation
network and the engineer planning SOP table.
The focus of this chapter will be to formulate the engi-
neer resource allocation problem as it relates to the coun-
termobility case. The nature of the objective function will
be discussed and a generalized heuristic algorithm will be
presented. In addition, the initial structure for a Branch
and Bound algorithm will be presented. The chapter will
conclude by discussing alternative approaches to the network
interdiction problem.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
1 . Problem Statement
Consider a highway system as it is represented in
the Research Model. The transportation system consists of
numbered nodes and connecting arcs. Each arc indicates a
segment of road or trafficable terrain of uniform character-
istics and each node represents a junction. Along each arc
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are targets which represent sites of possible interdiction.
Examples of targets would include bridges, tunnels, points
on a highway, and terrain constrictions. Engineer forces may
interdict some or all of these targets by employing various
combinations of systems such as squads and bulldozer teams,
and materials such as mines and demolitions. Confronted with
limited resources, the obstacle allocation model must make
'intelligent' allocations of resources to targets to best
meet the objective of increasing the time for an enemy to
traverse a portion of the network. The problem will be
confined to identifying an initial assignment of assets
within a defined planning period where each target may be
interdicted at most once. The definitions of indicies and
variables relevant to the problem formulation are found i'n
Tables 7 and 8.
TABLE 7
Indicies
• e = the type of enemy force against which the interdic-
tion plan is to be designed or evaluated. This identi-
fies a delay column in the SOP table.
• k = a technique for interdicting a target. This corre-
sponds to a unique row in the SOP table and identifies
how a target is to be interdicted and what the result
will be.
• r = a type of material standard package. Examples
include bridge demolition and M180 road crater
packages
.
• s = a type of engineer system. Combat engineer squads
and equipment teams represent catagories of systems
identified by this index.
• t = a target for potential interdiction. Each target on




c(i,i,e) = the time for a type e unit to traverse arc
(i,j) prior to interdiction.
c'(i.j,e) = the time for a type e unit to traverse arc
(i,j) after possible interdiction.
C(k,t) = the utility cost of performing technique k at
target t .
d(k,e) = the delay value associated with employing
technique k against a unit of type e. This corresponds
to an entry in a delay column in the SOP table.
D* = the maximum delay value of all remaining interdic-
tion assets at an intermediate stage of plan
development
.
H = the duration of the planning horizon.
m(s,k) = the number of type s systems necessary to
perform technique k.
M(s) = the number of type s units available during the
planning horizon.
n(r,k) = the number of type r resources necessary to
perform technique k.
N(r) = the number of type r resources available during
the planning horizon.
Tm(k,t) = the expected time to move assets to perform
technique k at target t.
Tw(k) = the onsite worktime to accomplish technique k.
U = an upper bound on V( X ).
V( X ) = the magnitude of the minimum path associated
with a plan X.
X(k,t) = a decision variable which is equal to 1 if
technique k is assigned to target t; otherwise.
X = a set of decision variables which describes a
unique interdiction allocation plan.
X* = an optimal interdiction allocation plan.
Y(k) = the number of times that technique k would have
to be employed to maximize the delay value of remaining
assets
.
Z(k,t) = a data variable which is set to 1 if technique






The following sets of constraints define a feasible
solution space for the allocation problem:
a. Asset Availability
m(s,k)X(k,t) < M(s) for all s (6.1)
k,t
/_, n(r,k)X(k,t) < N(r) for all r (6.2)
k, t
b. Time Feasibility
(Tm(k,t) + Tw(k)}X(k,t) < H for all k,t (6.3)
c. Technique Feasibility
X(k,t) < Z(k,t) for all k,t (6.4)
d. Singularity of Target Interdiction





After each interdiction of a target on an arc (i,j),
an additional delay is incurred by a unit traversing that
arc. It is assumed that these delays are additive. This
implies that each interdicted target has an effect which is
independent of the number of such targets the unit has
encountered. Thus, enemy resource depletion is not
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considered. The value of an arc time cost parameter after
an interdiction is calculated as follows:
c'(i,j,e) = c(i,j,e) + ^ d(k,e)X(k,t) (6.6)
k, t
Where: e is as specified by input.
t ranges over the subset of targets on (i,j).
4 . Obj ect ive Function
Consider the interdiction planning problem where an
enemy force will arrive at a local source node u, at the
conclusion of a period of duration H. The interdiction
planner does not know the specific composition of the enemy
force, but it is known that it will be of the generic type,
e. The desired objective is to identify from among a set of
feasible plans { X } , that plan Xj^ which makes as large as
possible the minimum time for the enemy to arrive at a local
sink node v. That is, the objective is to maximize the
minimum time path for a unit of type e from u to v subject
to the constraints in Equations 6.1 through 6.5.
Solving for the minimum path from u to v through a
network interdicted in accordance with a plan X is equiva-
lent to solving a network flow problem where the goal is to
send a single unit of flow from source to sink at minimum
cost. The cost associated with each arc (i,j) is c'(i,j,e);
the time for a type e enemy to traverse the arc following
possible interdiction. This standard minimum cost flow
problem can be modelled as shown in Figure 6.1 where f(i,j)
is a function representing the flow across arc (i,j)
[Ref . 18: p. 41] .
The first constraint in Figure 6.1 ensures that
exactly one unit of flow leaves the source node u. The
second set of constraints guarantees that conservation of
flow is not violated as the flow moves through the network.
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Minimize L, c ' ( i , j , e ) f ( i , j )
Subj ect to :
I f(u,j) - I f(j,u) = 1
J J
Lu f(i,j) - L. f(j,i) = for i / u or v
j J
I f(v,j) - Z f(J,v) = -1
J J
f (i, j ) > for all i,
j
Figure 6.1 Minimum Path Formulation.
The third constraint ensures that the unit of flow arrives
at the sink node v. The minimum cost path is that sequence
of arcs (i,j) such that f(i,j) = 1.
A conceptual approach to solving the allocation
problem would be to enumerate all feasible plans X, solve
the associated minimum path problem for each, and select as
X" that plan which has the greatest objective function value
V( X ).
While such an approach would identify an optimal
plan, it is of little practical value since the number of
feasible plans can be quite large. Consider a simplistic
problem in which there are 50 targets and 25 technique
teams, each of which can interdict any target. Even if one
considers only plans which specify full utilization of
teams, there are over 126 trillion unique plans to evaluate.
83
An alternative approach is to construct an algorithm
which incrementally allocates assets to interdict targets
based on a set of reasonable rules. This heuristic approach
is commonly used to resolve the scarce resource problem in
project planning activity networks [Ref. 19: p. 155]. While
no claim of optimality is made, the method can produce
feasible, practical solutions.
C. HEURISTIC ALGORITHM
The purpose of this section is to propose a generalized
heuristic algorithm for asset allocation in the countermo-
bility mission and to discuss the nature of the rules which
can guide the process. The basic structure of the algorithm
is :
1. Initialize the data.
2. Calculate the minimum time path for a force of type e
through the network from the source node u to the
sink node v.
3. Select and interdict the most cost effective,
feasible target on the path from Step 2. If no selec-
tion can be made, terminate the algorithm.
4. Return to Step 2.
The algorithm terminates when one of the following condi-
tions is met
:
• No feasible technique remains to interdict a target on
the minimum path.
• All targets on the current minimum path are
interdicted
.




Several items of data must be available to
initialize the procedure. The region of the transportation
network to be considered must be defined. In general, this
will amount to specifying the local source and sink nodes, u
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and v, and the sets of relevant nodes and arcs which are
contained in the region. Relevant arcs are those over which
an enemy unit of type e could travel. Thus, only a subset of
the transportation network is input. All interdictable sites
t, and arc time costs c(i,j,e) associated with the subset
network are also included. The planning horizon H, and the
quantities of system assets M(s) and expendable resource
standard packages N(r) are input to the algorithm.
Reference data available through the SOP table will
include the sets of technological coefficients m(s,k) and
n(r,k), the onsite worktimes Tw(k) , and the delay values
associated with each technique d(k,e). The set of all
expected times Tm(k,t), for moving assets to targets, must
be generated and should represent the time for the slowest
piece of equipment in the technique team to arrive at a
target. A multiterminal shortest chain algorithm which
determines the minimum cost route between all pairs of nodes
in a network can be used to establish expected lower bounds
on these movement times [Ref. 18: p. 53].
2 . Minimum Time Path
Initially, the minimum time path through the network
can be determined with all arc cost parameters represented
by c(i,j,e). Subsequent determinations will use the values
c'(i,j,e) as determined by Equation 6.6. Rather than deter-
mining the minimum path by solving a linear program as in
Figure 6.1, it is frequently more computationally efficient
to employ a labeling procedure such as Dijkstra's algorithm
[Ref. 18: p. 46]. This method systematically explores a
network from source to sink node assigning a temporary label
at each node which represents the direct cost from the
source to that node. As it is determined that a node belongs
to the minimum path, its label becomes permanent. When the
sink node is permanently labeled, the algorithm terminates
and all nodes with permanent labels are on the minimum path.
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3 . Target Selection
Once a path has been selected by Step 2, a search is
made for all targets on the arcs associated with the path.
If there are no targets available for interdiction on the
current minimum path, the algorithm terminates.
Several heuristics can be proposed to guide target
selection. The development of a scheme which could enable
cost comparisons between alternatives would be highly desir-
able since target selection could be based on a benefit-cost
ratio. Any reasonable measure of cost could be considered.
Each technique k has associated with it the number of
systems and resource packages necessary to perform it. In
addition, the onsite worktime is known. These factors,
combined with the travel time to arrive at the worksite,
offer several measures of resource cost . Other measures
,
such as man-hours or equipment-hours, can be derived from
them. A utility function can be expressed to transform these
dissimilar costs into a common unit of measure. The number
of 'utiles', C(k,t), would then be the cost of performing
technique k at target t
.
A greedy heuristic can be formulated which selects
for interdiction by technique k, that feasible target t on
the current minimum path which has the largest ratio of
delay value d(k,e) per utile cost C(k,t). An alternative
would be to consider the effect an interdiction would have
on the subsequent minimum path. In this case, a tentative
new minimum path would need to be determined for each
target /technique pair under consideration. An effectiveness
measure could then be the change in minimum path magnitude
per utile cost
.
The construction of the utility cost function could
also take into account other factors such as range to the
target. The weighting could be adjusted to favor those
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targets within direct fire antitank weapons range, or alter-
natively, those targets at the maximum range of air and
artillery effectiveness.
The feasibility of any interdiction can be checked
by temporarily assigning a null valued X(k,t) a value of 1
for the k,t pair under consideration. If none of the
constraint sets in Equations 6.1 through 6.5 are violated,
the interdiction is declared feasible at a given iteration
and is recorded. The value of X(k,t) would then be reset to
0, and the next k,t pair would be considered. If it is
determined that no feasible techniques exist for inter-
dicting any of the targets on the current minimum path, the
algorithm is terminated.
The k,t pair which is both feasible and best meets
the chosen selection criterion is identified and the value
of X(k,t) is assigned a permanent value of 1. The algorithm
then returns to Step 2, the values of c'(i,j,e) are updated,
and a new and possibly different minimum path is determined.
4 . Algorithm Variations
Two variations to the proposed algorithm might be
considered for inclusion. The first would alter the stated
objective to include the possibility of interdicting
feasible targets not on the minimum path. This could be done
when engineer assets remained after all feasible interdic-
tions to the minimum path were accomplished. Targets on
successively longer paths could be considered until all
assets were exhausted or all targets had been considered.
One justification for such a procedure could be to increase
the likelihood that the minimum path route would be selected
by the enemy. This could work to the benefit of a defending
force if it reduced uncertainty concerning the attacking
force course of action.
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A second variation could establish a swapping proce-
dure which would exchange targets selected for interdiction
with those not selected if such a trade resulted in an
increase in the minimum path. This procedure would be appli-
cable if uninterdicted targets existed on the current
minimum path which could be interdicted by assets assigned
elsewhere. Once a k,t match was established, the values of
the two X(k,t) variables could be temporarily exchanged and
the resultant minimum path evaluated. If there was an
improvement, the exchange would become permanent. Otherwise,
the X(k,t) values would revert to their prior magnitudes.
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has incorporated this
concept into a network interdiction model [Ref. 20: p. 12].
D . EXAMPLE
This section illustrates the interdiction of a sector
network by use of the heuristic algorithm discussed in the
previous section. The scenario is as was described in the
example of Chapter V. Part I of this example develops the
obstacle plan for AA2 under Blue strategy B(2) by planning
against a generic enemy force, e=l. Part II evaluates the
enemy minimum transit time through the sector for the case
of R(l) verses B(2) where e=2.
1. Part I: AA2 Obstacle Plan
a. Initialization
Several items of data are required from the
brigade engineer planning model to initialize the obstacle
allocation model. The sector network corresponding to AA2 is
input and appears as Figure 6.2. Node 1 is specified as the
source and node 4 as the sink. The generic enemy force e=l
has been specified for planning purposes and the arc time





2 Secondary Road/No Bypass
3 Secondary Road/lOOm Offroad
4 Primary Road/ 100m Offroad
5 Open Field/300m width
Interdictable Target
§ Interdicted Target
Figure 6.2 AA2 : Initial Network (e=l).
Figure 6.2 also depicts the location and type of
interdictable target sites on the network, t=l to t=5. The
planning horizon H is equal to 8 hours. Blue strategy B(2)
specifies that one organic engineer platoon and one augmen-
tation package be allocated to AA2 . The composition of these





1 organic platoon + 1 augmentation package
s: System M(s): Qty r: Material N(r): Qty
1 squad 3+1 = 4 1 bridge 3 + 2 = 5
2 dozer
team
0+1 = 1 2 M180 2 + = 2
3 MFJ 1 + = 1
4 MOPMS 1 + = 1
5 Diesel + 2 = 2
TABLE 10
Movement Times and Utile Costs
Z(k,t): tf. 1 2 3 4 5 Tm(k,t) C(k,t)
k=l 10000 4 8
2 00010 2 7
3 01000 6 1
4 01000 6 2
5 00100 5 6
6 00001 1 15
7 00001 2 3
The allowable interdictions Z(k,t), and relevant
movement times Tm(k,t) and utile costs C(k,t) are enumerated
in Table 10. Reference data such as technological coeffi-
cients m(s,k) and n(r,k), onsite worktimes Tw(k) , and delay
values d(k,e) are specified in the abbreviated SOP table
presented as Table 11. Finally, the values X(k,t); k= 1 to
7, t=l to 5 are initialized to 0.
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b. Iteration 1
Once the data has been initialized, the minimum
path through the current network from node 1 to node 4 is
determined. Inspection of Figure 6.2 reveals that this path
is (1,2), (2,4) which has a value of 6 hours. Targets t=l
and t=4 are the uninterdicted targets on the current minimum
path. The selection procedure examines each allowable tech-
nique for interdicting these targets to establish that
constraints 6.1 through 6.5 are satisfied. Once feasibility
is established, the delay/cost ratio d(k, e) /C (k, t ) is evalu-
ated. The feasible interdiction (k,t) which has the largest
delay/cost ratio is selected for inclusion in the obstacle
plan and X(k,t) is permanently set to 1.
The first target to be considered is t-1. An
examination of Table 10 shows that k=l is the only allowable
interdiction technique for t=l. Thus, X(l,l) is temporarily
assigned a value of 1 to test the feasibility of this inter-
diction. Substitution of k= 1 , s=l, t=l into constraint 6.1
and reference to Table 9 and Table 11 yields:
m(l,l)X(l,l) < M(l) (6.7)
where m(l,l)=l and M(l)=4. Since s=l is the only system
asset required by k= 1 , it is not necessary to test the
constraint for s=2. Thus constraint set 6.1 is satisfied.
Similarly, substitution of k= 1 , r=l, t=l into constraint 6.2
yields
:
n(l,l)X(l,l) < N(l) (6.8)
where n(l,l)=4 and N(l)=5. This is the only resource
constraint that must be checked for k=l and so constraint
set 6.2 is also satisfied. The time feasibility of the
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interdiction is checked by constraint 6.3 which becomes upon
substitution:
(Tm(l,l) + Tw(l)}X(l,l) < H (6.9)
where Tm(l,l)=4, Tw(l)=3, and H=8. Thus, the interdiction
is time feasible. Technique allowability is established by
reference to Table 10.
X(l,l) * Z(l,l) (6.10)
Thus, constraint 6.4 is satisfied. Finally, Singularity of
target interdiction is established by constraint 6.5. Since
only X(l,l) has a value of 1 at present, the sum over all k
of X(k,l) is equal to 1.
X(l,l) < 1 (6.11)
All constraints 6.1 through 6.5 are satisfied and X(l,l) is
declared a feasible interdiction. The delay/cost ratio for
this interdiction is calculated by referring to Table 11
where d(l,l)=3.0, and to Table 10 where C(l,l)=8.0.
d(l,l)/C(l,l) = 3.0/8.0 = .375 (6.12)
The temporary value of X(l,l) is reset to and the next
target is considered.
Reference to Table 10 establishes that target
t=4 may only be interdicted by technique k=2. The interdic-
tion X(2,4) can be shown to be feasible by substitution into
the constraints 6.1 through 6.5 as was done for the previous
target. (Note that two inequalities must be satisfied for
constraint set 6.2 since two resources r=2 and r=3 are
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involved in technique k=2.) The delay/cost ratio for this
interdiction is:
d(2,l)/C(2,4) = 1.0/7.0 = .143 (6.13)
At this point all feasible techniques for interdicting the
current minimum path have been considered. Since .375>.143,
target t=l is selected for interdiction by technique k= 1 and
X(l,l) is permanently set to 1. The new time cost parameter
for arc (1,2) is determined by substitution into Equation
6.6.
c'(l,2,l) = 2 + {(3.0)(1)> = 5 (6.14)
The sector network is updated and appears as Figure 6.3.
c. Iteration 2
Reference to Figure 6 . 3 reveals that the new
minimum path from node 1 to node 4 is (1,3), (3,4) which has
a value of 7 hours. The targets available for interdiction
on this path are t=2, t=3, and t=5. Target t=2 will be
considered first.
Inspection of Table 10 shows that target t=2
must be considered for interdiction by both techniques k=3
and k=4. In examining the feasibility of interdictions, it
must be recalled that X(l,l) has been set to 1 and thus some
assets are already committed to target t=l. The system asset
feasibility check for k=3, t=2 is:
m(l,l)X(l,l) + m(l,3)X(3,2) < M(l) (6.15)
which becomes upon substitution:





Figure 6.3 AA2 : First Interdiction.
Subsequent checks on constraints 6.2 through 6.5 confirm
that k=3 is a feasible interdiction technique for t=2. The
delay/cost ratio is:
d(3,l)/C(3,2) = 1.0/1.0 = 1.0 (6.17)
Examination of the case k=4, t=2 establishes that no
constraints 6.1 through 6.5 are violated. The delay/cost
ratio is:
d(4,l)/C(4,2) = 1.5/2.0 = .75 (6.18)
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Target t = 3 may be interdicted by technique k=5.
However, an evaluation for feasibility reveals that
constraint 6.3 is violated since
(Tm(5,3) + Tw(5)}X(5,3) < H (6.19)
becomes upon substitution:
{5+4 }(1) > 8. (6.20)
Thus, the interdiction X(5,3) is declared time infeasible
and no delay/cost ratio need be calculated for this case.
The final target for consideration on the
current minimum path is t=5. Table 10 shows that both k=6
and k=7 are allowable interdiction techniques. Feasibility
checks for k=6, t=5 show that constraint 6.2 is violated
since
n(3,6)X(6,5) < N(3) (6.21)
becomes upon substitution:
(3)(1) > 1. (6.22)
The interdiction X(6,5) is declared resource infeasible
since technique k=6 requires 3 MFJ minefield standard pack-
ages and there is only one available. In the same manner the
interdiction X(7,5) is declared resource infeasible since
constraint 6.2 is violated. Technique k=7 requires 3 diesel






Figure 6.4 AA2 : Second Interdiction.
Target t = 2 is the only feasible interdiction
site on the current minimum path. Based on the delay/cost
ratios, ( 1.00 > .75 ), k=3 is selected as the interdiction
technique and X(3,2) is permanently set to 1. The modified
arc cost parameter for arc (1,3) becomes:
c' (1,3,1) = 3 + {(1.0)(1)} = 4 (6.23)




It is evident from Figure 6.4 that the new
minimum path from node 1 to node 4 is again (1,3), (3,4)
which now has a value of 8 hours. The uninterdicted targets
on this path are t=3 and t=5. However, t=3 was shown to be
infeasible at Iteration 2 as was t=5. Thus, there are no
feasible interdictions to the current minimum path and the
algorithm terminates. The obstacle plan for this sector is X
= { X(l,l)=l, X(3,2)=l }. The remainder of this example will
calculate the effect of this obstacle plan against an enemy
force of type e = 2.
2. Part II : Evaluation
Part I of this example developed an obstacle plan
for AA2 by utilizing the assets allocated by Blue strategy
B(2) and by planning against a generic enemy of type e=l.
This portion of the example will evaluate the expected
minimum transit time of an force of type e=2 through this
interdicted network. It is emphasized that the obstacle plan
from Part I, X = { X(l,l)=l, X(3,2)=l > remains in effect.
However, the arc time costs c(i,j,e) and delay values d(k,e)
will change to reflect the mobility characteristics of the
type e=2 force.
Recall that Equation 6.6 expresses the value of the
arc time cost parameter for an arc (i,j) after possible
interdiction. To evaluate the sector network against an
enemy force of type e=2 it is necessary to read values of
c(i,j,2) from Research Model data files and d(k,2) from
Figure 11.
With the plan from Part I still in effect, the
values of c'(i,j,2) are determined by Equations 6.24 through
6.28. The corresponding network is shown in Figure 6.5. The
minimum path through this network is (1,3), (3,4) which has









Figure 6.5 AA2 : Evaluation (e = 2)
(1,2,2) = 1 + { (6.0)(1) } = 7
(1,3,2) = 3 + { (3.0)(1) } = 6
(2,3,2) = 2 + { } =2
(2,4,2) = 3 + { } =3







E. BRANCH AND BOUND
It was previously mentioned that explictly enumerating
all plans X and evaluating them for optimality was computa-
tionally infeasible for most problems of practical signifi-
cance. While this is true, it is generally not necessary to
conduct such an exhaustive search if a set of reliable rules,
can be developed which exclude from consideration subsets of
solutions which cannot contain the optimum. The method of
Branch and Bound (BB) accomplishes this [Ref. 19: p. 201].
BB follows a heuristic tree search in which the space of
feasible solutions is systematically searched until the
optimum is reached. BB alternately applies two operations;
subset formation and subset elimination. The first forms new
subsets of alternatives while the second eliminates subsets
from futher consideration. At the conclusion of the proce-
dure, each point in the solution space will have been either
explicitly or implicitly enumerated. The utility of BB
depends on the selection of good rules which make as small
as possible the number of points which must be explicitly
enumerated. [Ref. 19: p. 201]
1. Rules
To apply BB to the network interdiction problem,
three guiding rules will be established.
1. Only feasible interdictions should be considered at
each step of the enumeration process, since only
feasible allocation plans can be optimal.
2. As resources are successively applied to the network
to form an allocation plan X, either at least one
feasible target on the current minimum path will be
interdicted in a subsequent version of the current
plan, or the present plan and all its successor plans
cannot be optimal.
3. An upper bound on the value of a plan V( X ) can be
obtained at each step of the enumeration by adding to
the value of the current minimum path, an upper bound




The first rule may appear trivial, but it is useful
since the problem has well defined criteria for feasibility.
Thus, rather than only considering whether a given k,t
pairing is allowable, the addition of another target to the
interdiction plan X can be conditioned on which targets have
already been added to the plan.
The second rule in essence states that if something
can be done to increase a minimum path(s), then something
must be done or else the plan will be non-optimal and may be
discarded. For example, any plan which ignored feasible
targets on the first most minimum path through a network
would always have a value V( X ) which was equal to the
magnitude of that path, irrespective of how many resources
were directed against targets elsewhere.
The third rule is derived from the fact that the
ability to influence the minimum path is limited by
resources. The largest such a path could become is a func-
tion of the magnitude of the sum of the delay values d(k,e)
of an optimal mix of the remaining assets, and the magnitude
of the current minimum path. Due to target /technique incom-
patibility, it is unlikely that the resources could be
employed to produce their maximum delay benefit. However,
the formation of an upper bound is useful in eliminating
subsets of solutions from consideration.
One can obtain the maximum delay value of all uncom-
mitted resources for a current version of a plan X by
relaxing the target /technique compatibility requirement and
solving a linear program. This divorces resource delay
potential from the network and the difficult combinatorics
problem it represents. The formulation of the linear
program is given in Figure 6 .
6
Let D* be the optimal value of the objective func-
tion in Figure 6.6, and X the current version of a plan.





Zm(s,k)Y(k) < M'(s) for all s
k
Z n(r,k)Y(K) < N'(r) for all r
k
Y(k) > for all k
Where
:
e is fixed as per input
.
M'(s) = M(s) - X. m(s,k)X(k,t) for all s
k,t
N'(r) = N(r) - Z n(r,k)X(k,t) for all r
k,t
Y(k) = the number of times that technique k
would have to be employed to maximize
the delay value of the remaining
resources M'(s) and N'(r).
Figure 6.6 Maximum Delay Value Formulation.
path in any plan which includes the interdicted targets in
X can be found from Equation 6.29.
U = D* + V(X) (6.29)
2 . Procedure
The three rules can now be used to outline a general
procedure for employing the BB technique which is presented
as a sequential algorithm.
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1. Calculate a minimum path through the network. Record
its value V( X ) which is a lower bound on opti-
mality. Calculate an upper bound U from Equation 6.29
and record it. These values are ascribed to the root
node of the search tree.
2. Branch by considering each feasible way of inter-
dicting each target on the minimum path. This step
incorporates both Rules 1 and 2
,
and creates new
nodes. Each node corresponds to adding one feasible
interdiction to the predecessor plan. If no such
additions are possible, the node is said to be
fathomed. Other nodes on which a branching can occur
are said to be live.
3. Calculate new minimum paths for each new node and
record these lower bounds. Reapply Equation 6.29 to
determine upper bounds
.
4. Scan all the lower bounds and call the greatest lower
bound the incumbent. It is the best solution thus
far. If at any time the upper bound of a node is
equal to its lower bound, the node is fathomed.
Further, if the upper bound of any node is less than
the value of the incumbent, the node is fathomed and
"the plan represented by that node and any of its
possible successors are declared non-optimal.
5. Go to Step 2 and branch on all live nodes. If no live
nodes exist, the, value of the incumbent is the
optimal value V( XJ^ ) and the corresponding plan(s)
is(are) globally optimal.
3 . Additional Rules
Prior to implementing a Branch and Bound algorithm,
considerable research must be directed toward identifying
rules to speed the enumeration process. The approach
outlined above represents a simplistic application which may
not prove to be computationally feasible. A successful
algorithm must establish tight bounds on optimality by
closely examining the inherent structure of the problem.
Variations on the proposed algorithm may be consid-
ered in future research. For example, rather than simulta-
neously branching on all live nodes as in Step 5, a 'depth
first' search could specify branching on that live node
which had the greatest upper bound, since it might be
considered most likely to contain the optimum. This
branching would continue on successor nodes to the current
node until a node had been fathomed. The search would then
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backtrack up the search tree until the first live node was
encountered. The branching could then resume, again
choosing a successor node with the greatest upper bound at
each branching step. As before, the process would terminate
when no live nodes existed.
F. ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Previous models for interdicting transportation networks
generally have used concepts other than delay as a criteria.
Often the network consists of capacitated arcs and the
objective usually focuses on minimizing the maximum flow
through the network by identifying the minimum cut set.
Flow often represents a measure such as tons of logistics
per day. A cut set is defined as a set of arcs which, when
removed, divides the network into two sub-networks; one
containing the source node, the other the sink node. The
value of a cut set is defined to be the sum of the capaci-
ties of the arcs in the cut set. The maximum flow-minimum
cut theorem states that the maximum flow possible through a
network, from source to sink, is equal to the value of the
minimum cut set [Ref. 18: p. 149].
Algorithms were proposed by Mustin [Ref. 21] and Nugent
[Ref. 22] for allocating airstrikes to interdict a network
by targeting arcs comprising a minimum feasible cut set. No
consideration was given to the repair times required to
restore arc capacities.
Wollmer [Ref. 23] considered the problem of targeting
interdictions for the purpose of maximizing the costs
associated with maintaining a given level of flow through a
network. Costs were assumed to be linear or piece-wise
linear functions of flow.
Sullivan [Ref. 24] proposed a method of maximizing
transit time through a network by selecting arcs for air
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interdiction. Arc parameters were replaced by time dependent
functions once interdicted. An algorithm was detailed which
determined the best interdiction site at each iteration. The
algorithm was open-ended having no established termination
criteria.
A more recent model is the Network Interdiction Model /
Decision Support System (NIM) developed by CNA [Ref. 20].
NIM is an interactive model which was designed to aid inter-
diction planners. It permits a selection of three objective
criteria; maximum delay, greatest reduction of maximum flow,
and least accumulated flow over a specified period. The
model extracts target information from the Defense
Intelligence Agency data base and produces engineering data
based on a procedure developed by the U. S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Engineer Study Group. The model uses a heuristic
method of target selection and employs efficient implementa-
tions of network evaluation algorithms. The similarities
between NIM and the present research effort suggest that a




VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A . SUMMARY
It is evident that the combat engineers within a corps
and division comprise a highly heterogeneous system with
multidimensional missions. A unifying factor is that most
combat engineer effort is directed at modifying terrain for
tactical advantage. Time has been hypothesized as a relevant
decision criterion for evaluating the contribution of engi-
neer effort, especially as it relates to the movement times
of tactical units through a transportation network.
Maximizing the minimum time path through a network can be a
desirable countermobility objective since it provides a
solution which establishes an expected lower bound on enemy
transit times. Such a result compliments the overall game
theoretic decision structure which can be employed to opti-
mize the expected payoff to a unit
.
A brigad-e engineer planning model was developed which
employs a TPZS game as a decision structure to select
courses of action from among sets of possible resource allo-
cation alternatives. The procedure is a sub-optimization
since only a limited range of options are considered.
Two methods for approaching the resource allocation
problem in the countermobility case were discussed. An
incremental heuristic algorithm, called the obstacle alloca-
tion model, was developed which successively interdicts the
minimum time path at each iteration until no further such
interdictions can be accomplished. The method relies on a
set of rules to choose the minimum path target which is the
most "cost effective" in view of a utility function designed
to permit cost comparisons among unlike resources.
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A second approach considered the initial structure of a
Branch and Bound algorithm to identify an optimal allocation
plan. In this approach, relative resource cost was not
considered. The optimal solution was defined to be that
allocation of available assets which maximized the minimum
path through the network. Three rules were proposed to guide
the process. Addition rules must be identified to make the
method practical.
B. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Several areas for future research are necessary for the
development of an operational engineer planning module. An
extensive data base corresponding to the concept of an SOP
table must be established. Much of the information
required, such as construction times and material require-
ments, is available in engineer doctrinal literature; with
skill manuals, field manuals and unit test and evaluation
material being excellent sources. Other data will be more
difficult to obtain. For example, delay values associated
with standard obstacles must be determined for a- wide range
of potential threats. Development of these planning esti-
mates will be complicated by the difficulty of obtaining
extensive threat performance data.
Further research must be conducted to establish the
feasibility of dynamically generating sets of game strat-
egies within the model. The determination of a game theo-
retic optimal solution is itself a significant computational
problem. However, creating the space of alternatives from
which the solution is to be selected is a major research
challenge. It may become necessary to establish windows for
human interaction with the Model to support this need.
Heuristics must be chosen for the target selection
procedure of the network interdiction algorithm. In
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particular, the notion of resource cost must be formulated
through the development of a utility function. As previously
discussed, several types of cost may be considered for
inclusion.
Research should be directed at establishing additional
rules to guide the branch formation and elimination
processes of the Branch and Bound algorithm. The successful
implementation of this technique requires that the fewest
possible number of nodes be explicitly enumerated. Tight
bounds on optimality conserve the computational resources
which must be dedicated to the problem, while loose bounds
do little to exclude subsets of solutions from explicit
consideration.
An enhancement of the current allocation model would
formulate the problem to include multiple time periods and
asset locations. The present model considers only an
initial allocation of assets from a common resource pool.
The resource allocation problem must be formulated to
support the mobility mission. Of immediate interest will be
the selection of an objective function. One option is to
consider directing engineer effort toward that path which
provides the quickest route for the currently supported
unit. Another option is to identify the path which can
become the minimum time path through the network once all
engineer activity has been completed. This method considers
subsequent users of the route and is related to the general
engineering mission of developing the infrastructure of the
battle area.
The development of a generalized value system for the
research model will permit the explicit consideration of the
survivability and general engineering mission areas. Its
development should also be readily adaptable to mobility and
countermobility missions, since the value system as
currently envisioned will employ the concepts of time and
time discounting to impute values to supporting units.
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